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C ON CLU SION ...................................................................................

33 1

INTRODUCTION

Some forty years ago, in ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore,' the
United States Supreme Court held that the rule of mutuality of estoppel was no longer an absolute bar to the invocation of issue preclusion
for the benefit of a plaintiff who had been a stranger to the prior (F-1)
litigation against a defendant who had been party to both the F-I and
present (F-2) cases. 2 In so ruling, the Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to Judge Traynor's dramatic takedown of the mutuality rule in3
Bernhardv. Bank ofAmerica National Trust and Savings Association
nearly four decades earlier. The outcome in Parklanewas also foreshadowed by the Court's earlier ruling in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation.4 There, the Court rejected
mutuality where the stranger to F-I invoked the F-I decision holding
a patent invalid as a defense to an infringement suit in F-2 involving
the same patent.5 Blonder Tongue was consistent with the trend in
many state and lower federal court decisions that had abrogated mutuality where preclusion was interposed defensively. 6 Parklane, of
course, involved offensive non-mutual issue preclusion,7 and at the
time of the Blonder Tongue decision, many courts drew a line distinguishing defensive and offensive non-mutual preclusion, allowing the
former but not the latter. 8 Parklaneacknowledged this bright-line distinction but rejected an outright ban on offensive non-mutual issue
preclusion, leaving it to the trial courts to determine on a case-by-case
basis when it should be applied. 9 The Court in Parklanethus stopped
short of a blanket approval of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion,
and qualified its holding in three important respects: (1) a defendant
must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the case in F- 1; (2)
1. 439 U.S. 322 (1979); For a detailed discussion of Parklane,see Lewis A.
Grossman, The Story of Parklane: The "Litigation Crisis" and the Efficiency Imperative, in CIvIL PROCEDURE STORIEs 405 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2008).
2. 439 U.S. at 327-33.
3. 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942).
4. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
5. Id. at 328-29.
6. Id. at 324-25.
7. Parklane,439 U.S. at 326.
8. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 324 n. 11; Parklane,439 U.S. at 329 n. 11.
9. Parklane,439 U.S. at 331; see infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
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invocation of non-mutual issue preclusion must not produce an unfair
result; and (3) the decision of whether or not to allow offensive nonmutual issue preclusion is left to the sound discretion of the trial court
and thus is not a matter of right.' °
Following Parklane, many,1 1 but not all, 12 states have abrogated the rule of mutuality and now allowed offensive non-mutual
10. Parklane,439 U.S. at 329-333.
11. See, e.g., Watkins v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 370 S.W.3d 848,
855-856 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009); Central Bank Denver v. Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz
& Wilson, 940 P.2d 1097, 1103 (Colo. App. 1997); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jones,
596 A.2d 414, 422-423 (Conn. 1991); Reinhard & Kreinberg v. Dow Chemical Co.,
No. 3003-CC, 2008 WL 868108, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2008); Mastrangelo v.
Sandstrom, Inc., 55 P.3d 298, 303 (Idaho 2002); Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762,
768 (Me. 1979); Oates v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo.
1979) (en banc); Peterson v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 281 N.W.2d 525, 527 (Neb.
1979); Cutter v. Town of Durham, 411 A.2d 1120, 1121 (N.H. 1980); O'Connor v.
G & R Packing Co., 426 N.Y.S.2d 557, 567 (App. Div. 1980); B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v.
Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147 (1967) ("[T]he 'doctrine of mutuality' is a dead letter.");
Shannon v. Moffett, 604 P.2d 407, 409 (Or. 1979); Steven P. Nonkes, Note, Reducing the Unfair Effects of Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Through Damage Limits, 94
CORNELL L. REv. 1459, 1467 and cases cited at n. 59 (2009); see generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 Reporter's Note (AM. LAW INST.
1982) (stating that abrogation of mutuality has acquired "general acceptance").
12. See, e.g., Minnifield v. Wells Fargo Bank, 771 S.E.2d 188, 192 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2015) ("In Georgia, mutual identity of parties is required for collateral estoppel
.... "); Mosley v. Trans Rent-A-Car, Inc., 650 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982); Bailey v. Harris Brake Fire Protection Dist., 697 S.W.2d 916, 917-18 (Ark.
1985); Newport Div., Tenneco Chemicals, Inc. v. Thompson, 330 So. 2d 826, 82728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins v. Glasgow, 478 N.E.2d
918, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Atencio v. Vigil, 521 P.2d 646, 648-49 (N.M. 1974);
Tar Landing Villas Owners Ass'n v. Town of Atlantic Beach, 307 S.E.2d 181, 184
(N.C. Ct. App. 1983); Wolverton v. Holcomb, 329 S.E.2d 885, 888-89 (W. Va.
1985); Redmond v. Bankester, 757 So. 2d 1145, 1150 n.2 (Ala. 1999) (requiring
mutuality of collateral estoppel); Cook Inlet Keeper v. State, 46 P.3d 957, 966
(Alaska 2002) (same); Regency Park, LP v. City of Topeka, 981 P.2d 256, 265 (Kan.
1999) (same); Hofsommer v. Hofsommer Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 380, 384
(N.D. 1992) ("For purposes of both res judicata and collateral estoppel in this state,
only parties or their privies may take advantage of or be bound by the former judgment."); Scales v. Lewis, 541 S.E.2d 899, 901 (Va. 2001) ("[T]here also must be
'mutuality' i.e., a litigant cannot invoke collateral estoppel unless he would have
been bound had the litigation of the issue in the prior action reached the opposite
result."(quoting Angstadt v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. 457 S.E.2d 86, 87 (Va. 1995))); see,
e.g., Kiara Lake Estates, LLC v. Bd. of Park Comm'rs 0.0. McIntyre Park Dist.,
No. 2:13-cv-522, 2014 WL 773437, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2014) ("[C]ollateral
estoppel may generally be applied only when the party seeking to use the prior judgment and the party against whom the judgment is being asserted were parties.... ");
Burruss v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 46 A.3d 1182, 1194 (Md. 2012) (noting that Maryland law permits only defensive non-mutual issue preclusion); see generally,
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issue preclusion. In effect, Parklaneand Blonder-Tonguehave shifted
presumptions 180 degrees. Instead of a rule of mutuality subject to
specific exceptions, we now have a rule of non-mutuality subject to
results. 13
exceptions where that approach would generate unfair
Some influential scholars have argued that Parklane definitively settled the matter of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion, and
mutuality. 14
that little is served today in debating the pros and cons of
Other scholars argue that Parklanewent too far and that a rule of mutuality with a few defined exceptions is preferable to a rule of non5
mutuality with a lot of fuzzy exceptions. 1 Little has been written
about Parklanein recent years. Meanwhile, litigation in federal courts
has grown increasingly complex in the years since Parklanewas decided. Accordingly, this is an ideal time to reassess whether, and the
extent to which, mutuality should play a role in issue preclusion analysis. Historically, the law of res judicata in the United States has
evolved at a glacial pace. One commentator has suggested that the
reasons for the slow development of res judicata law were that the

"subject was not yet satisfactorily systematized," and that "[o]ften res

judicata came up only when a litigant had taken a misstep that mired
the court in repetitive litigation, and therefore res judicata tended to be
envisaged as an arcane jumble of technical and arbitrary provisions to
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 Reporter's Note (AM. LAW INST.

1982).
13. But see ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A
HANDBOOK ON ITS THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 185 (2001) ("A basic choice

exists between the rule of mutuality, with a few defined extensions, and the rule of
nonmutuality, with lots of fuzzy exceptions. These two are not alternative formulations that end up at the same place in the middle. On the one hand, the extensions
to mutuality were rare and limited, playing it safe and simple in extending res judicata to situations of real need such as secondary liability. The extensions certainly
did not aim at reaching every case in which, on balance, preclusion would be desirable. On the other hand, the exceptions to nonmutuality are many, but they surely
do not reach all situations beyond the coverage of mutuality's extensions. The prevailing exceptions do not even recognize all the reasons that preclusion might be
undesirable.").
14.

See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.

COOPER, 18A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4464, at 695 (3d ed. 2017)

("With nonmutual issue preclusion thus firmly entrenched, little would be gained by
an exhaustive study of the arguments for and against abandoning the mutuality
rule.").
15. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 13, at 185; see also Stephen B. Burbank, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common
Law: A GeneralApproach, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 733, 777 (1986) ("Following a vigorous and highly successful attack on mutuality, there now seems to be doubt about
the wisdom of the revolution.").
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handle this peculiar problem." 16 Two events spurred the rapid development of res judicata law in the twentieth century: (1) the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938; and (2) the publication of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments in 1982.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure featured simplified
pleading rules that eliminated the common law forms of action, 7 and
liberal joinder rules that made it easier to bring all claims and all litigants within a single cause of action.1 8 The Federal Rules thus invited
a broader application of res judicata principles. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments, following the path charted by the first Restatement
of Judgments, provided a framework through which courts could analyze and apply the res judicata doctrine more broadly. 19 Relying on
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, the Supreme Court "has embraced res judicata with an especially fervent ardor."2
The modem approach to res judicata has indeed led to a
broader application of preclusion principles designed to enable courts
to resolve all disputes between litigants in one action. 21 However, in
the past thirty years, the complexion of litigation in the federal courts
has changed dramatically and has brought about a corresponding
change in attitudes among judges on how to manage litigation. The
multiparty, multijurisdictional, multidistrict litigation that populates
today's federal dockets has grown increasingly complex. 22 In managing complex cases, judges no longer seek to try all cases in a single,

16.

Kevin M. Clermont, Res Judicataas a Requisitefor Justice, 68 RUTGERS

U. L. REv. 1067, 1073 (2016).
17.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 8(d)(i).

18. See FED. R. CIv.P. 18-21.
19. Clermont, supra note 16, at 1075.
20. Id.
21. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 1OA, at 651 (8th ed. 2017) ("Modem scholarship had looked hard at the
rules of res judicata and found that they had failed to keep pace with the rules of
procedure that they complement."); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971) ("[I]t is clear that more than crowded dockets is
involved.").
22. See Howard M. Erichson, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion,96 MICH. L. REV.
945, 945-46 (1998) ("With great frequency, multiple lawsuits arise out of single or
related transactions or events. Mass tort litigation and complex commercial litigation provide the most emphatic examples, but the phenomenon of multiple related
lawsuits extends to every comer of litigation, including intellectual property, matrimonial, criminal, antitrust, personal injury, securities, commercial, products liability, environmental, and civil rights.") (footnotes omitted).
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consolidated action. 23 Rather, judges may seek to break down the litigation into smaller pieces, looking for "fast track" or "bellwether"
cases that, once resolved, will lead to settlement of the remaining
cases. In these circumstances, questions of issue preclusion abound.
The question explored herein is whether the rule of Parklane
and its progeny remains a viable standard under the new litigation paradigm. This article (1) traces the evolution of the doctrine of issue
preclusion; (2) analyzes the rise and fall of the principle of mutuality;
(3) concludes that the concept of mutuality is ill-conceived and serves
to undermine principles of substantive law, as well as the basic goals
of preclusion--efficiency, finality, and consistency; and (4) further
concludes that the standards developed in Parklane regarding offensive non-mutual issue preclusion and its progeny strike the proper balance between the goals of preclusion, on the one hand, and basic principles of fairness, on the other hand. In sum, the current standards
regarding issue preclusion are working, and any proposal to return to
a mutuality regime would be an unfortunate step backward.

I. BACKGROUND

As one scholar has aptly noted, "every system ofjustice around
the world, from near its beginnings, has generated a common core of
res judicata law to make adjudications binding." 24 In Riordan v. Ferguson,25 Judge Charles Clark, the principal drafter of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and one of the most thoughtful jurists of the twentieth century, observed wryly that "[t]he defense of res judicata is universally respected, but actually not very well liked.",26 The distaste for
res judicata no doubt stems from the fact that it is widely viewed as
"an arcane jumble of technical and arbitrary rules blocking access to
courts" 27 that forces litigants and courts to continually weigh the needs

for repose and cost containment against the need for the courts to get

23.

Id. at 946-47 ("Proposed aggregation mechanisms that would allow the

consolidation of dispersed litigation appear destined for failure, at least in the near
term.").
24. Clermont, supra note 16, at 1079.
25.
26.

27.

147 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1945).
Id. at 988 (Clark, J., dissenting).
See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 13, at 3.
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Notwith-

standing this distaste, res judicata is universally respected out of practical necessity: "One who has had his day in court should not be permitted to litigate the question anew.",29 That is, a litigant is entitled to

28. DAVIDL. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONs 1617 (1st ed. 2001). Shapiro argues that the justifications for preclusion are pragmatic
in nature:
First, and perhaps foremost, the concept of repose. The finality of
a judgment in its fullest sense, allows the loser as well as the winner, to get on with his life; to put a controversy over a claim, or
even part of a claim or an issue embedded in the claim, behind him
and to move on to other things ....A related justification lies in
the often invoked argument that any system of justice must strive
not only for truth and accuracy but also for the avoidance of excessive costs. For a winning party to have to relitigate a claim
already decided in his favor imposes costs not only on him-both
financial and psychological-but also on the public in the form of
judicial expenses not paid for by the parties themselves ....And
another, less tangible cost to the system is the loss of 'prestige'
(for want of a better word) that attends the existence of inconsistent and even conflicting results ...[T]he lack of assurance that
a second adjudication will yield a 'better' or more 'accurate' result
militates against a general authorization of relitigation solely on
the assumption that a second consideration is more likely than the
first to get things right.
Id; see also Clermont, supra note 16, at 1089 ("Between minimal and maximal limits, the extent of res judicata is a matter of cost-benefit policy.").
29. Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 18 (N.Y. 1937).
The Court stated:
Behind the phrase resjudicatalies a rule of reason and practical
necessity. One who has had his day in court should not be permitted to litigate the question anew. Although normally it is necessary that mutuality of estoppel exist, an exception is at times made
where the party againstwhom the plea is raised was a party to the
prior action and 'had full opportunity to litigate the issue of its
responsibility.' (See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. George Colon &
Co., 260 N.Y. 305, 312.) Under such circumstances the judgment
is held to be conclusive upon those who were parties to the action
in which the judgment was rendered. Where a full opportunity
has been afforded to a party to the prior action and he has failed to
prove his freedom from liability or to establish liability or culpability on the part of another, there is no reason for permitting him
to retry these issues. Where the issue in the second action differs
in any way from that in the earlier action, the plea, of course is not
available.
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one bite-and only one bite-of the apple.3 ° Indeed, "the doctrine of
res judicata is a principle of universal jurisprudence forming part of
the legal system of all civilized nations. '"31
The phrase res judicata is sometimes used to describe all ways
in which a prior judgment can have preclusive effect in subsequent
litigation.32 Thus broadly defined, the phrase res judicata comprises
two separate, but interrelated doctrines: res judicata properly defined,
also known as claim preclusion; and collateral estoppel, also known
as issue preclusion. 33 The terminology claim preclusion and issue pre(Second) of Judgments
clusion has been adopted by the Restatement
34
article.
this
throughout
used
be
and will
Id.
30. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 324
(1971) ("[A] party who has had one fair and full opportunity to prove a claim and
has failed in that effort, should not be permitted to go to trial on the merits of that
claim a second time.") (citation omitted).
31. 2 A.C. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 627, at 1321
(5th ed. 1925).
32. See, e.g., Weaver Corp. v. Kidde, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 61,63 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
("One difficulty is that courts use 'res judicata' for two different concepts. Some
use it to mean claim preclusion. Others employ res judicata in a general sense, to
encompass both claim and issue preclusion.").
33. For an excellent explanation of modem preclusion terminology, see Kaspar
Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530,535-36 (5th Cir. 1978)
("The rules of res judicata, as the term is sometimes sweepingly used, actually comprise two doctrines concerning the preclusive effect of a prior adjudication. The first
such doctrine is 'claim preclusion,' or true res judicata. It treats a judgment, once
rendered, as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on
the same 'claim' or 'cause of action.' When the plaintiff obtains a judgment in his
favor, his claim 'merges' in the judgment; he may seek no further relief on that claim
in a separate action. Conversely, when a judgment is rendered for a defendant, the
plaintiff's claim is extinguished; the judgment then acts as a 'bar.' Under these rules
of claim preclusion, the effect of a judgment extends to the litigation of all issues
relevant to the same claim between the same parties, whether or not raised at trial.
The aim of claim preclusion is thus to avoid multiple suits on identical entitlements
or obligations between the same parties, accompanied, as they would be, by the redetermination of identical issues of duty and breach. The second doctrine, collateral
estoppel or 'issue preclusion,' recognizes that suits addressed to particular claims
may present issues relevant to suits on other claims. In order to effectuate the public
policy in favor of minimizing redundant litigation, issue preclusion bars the relitigation of issues actually adjudicated, and essential to the judgment, in a prior litigation
between the same parties. It is insufficient for the invocation of issue preclusion that
some question of fact or law in a later suit was relevant to a prior adjudication between the parties; the contested issue must have been litigated and necessary to the
judgment earlier rendered") (citations omitted).
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 23-29 (AM. LAW INST.
1982); see generally CASAD & CLERMONT, supranote 13, at 9.
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A. Claim Preclusion
1. Derivation
Claim preclusion is derived from the common law doctrines of
bar and merger and defense preclusion. 35 The doctrine of bar and merger addresses limitations on plaintiffs.3 6 The concept of merger is
somewhat metaphysical. At common law, if a plaintiff sued on a cause
of action and won, it would be awarded a judgment. Once the judgment was entered, the cause of action would merge into that judgment
and thus would no longer exist. 3 7 Therefore, it could not be sued upon
a second time. For example, suppose drivers A and B get into an automobile accident. A suffers a broken leg and facial lacerations and
sues B for negligence. A wins. Thereafter, A suffers debilitating headaches and is diagnosed with a serious brain injury stemming from the
accident. In F-2, A sues B again to recover for the brain injury caused
by the accident. A would be barred under the doctrine of merger. A's
cause of action for personal injury was merged with the F- 1 judgment
and no longer exists.
Similarly, under the doctrine of bar, if A sues B and loses, A
cannot re-sue B on the same cause of action. 3 8 For example, suppose
A sued B in state court and lost. Suppose further that the claim could
have been brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. A may
not go forward in federal court after having lost in state court. If the
state court case was wrongly decided, then A's remedy would be to
appeal the decision in the state appellate courts, not to re-sue in federal
court.
The defense preclusion rule mirrors the doctrine of bar and
merger. If A sues B and wins and thereafter seeks to enforce the judgment, then under the defense preclusion doctrine, B cannot raise defenses that have been or could have been raised in the original action.
Nor may B, following the entry ofjudgment for A, bring an action that
would effectively unravel the initial judgment for A. This "common
law compulsory counterclaim" rule prevents a losing defendant from
relitigating A's claim by using defenses as a basis for recovery. 9

35.
36.
37.
38.

See Clermont, supra note 16, at 1082-84.
Id.
Id. at 1084.
Id. at 1082-83.
39. Id. at 1083; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22(2)(a)-(b)
(AM. LAW INST. 1982).
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2. Requirements of Claim Preclusion
The defense of claim preclusion has three elements: (a) identical parties; (b) identical cause of action; and (c) the F-I judgment was
on the merits.4 °
i.

IdenticalParties

Ordinarily, the question of whether the parties to the F-1 and
F-2 judgments are the same is easy to determine. Simply look to see
if the same persons are parties to both cases. One who is not a party
to the F-I judgment cannot be bound by that judgment. 4 1 However,
courts have recognized that in certain circumstances, a non-party
stands in the shoes of the party in F-I and therefore is legally bound
by any determination made with respect to the party; e.g., if a nonparty A agrees to be bound by a judgment with respect to a party B,
then A and B are considered identical parties for claim preclusion purposes.4 2

40. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008); United States v. Ryan,
810 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 1987); Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736, 739 (4th Cir.
1990); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §19 cmt.a (dropping the on the
merits requirements).
"Because even though the "prototype case continues to be one in
which the merits of the claim are in fact adjudicated against the
plaintiff after trial... judgments not passing directly on the substance of a claim have come to operate as a bar."

Id.
41. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 893-95.
42. Id. The Court in Taylor identified six situations where a non-party may be
bound by an F-1 determination:
1. A nonparty to F-1 may be bound by that judgment where it
agrees to be bound.
2. A nonparty may be bound by F-1 based on certain "pre-existing
'substantive legal relationship[s]"' between it and a party to judgment. These relationships include, but are not limited to, successorship, bailor-bailee and assignor-assignee.
3. Where a nonparty was adequately represented in F- I by a party
with the same interests, it may be bound by F-1. The principal
example of this situation is the class action, but it also applies to
suits brought by trustees, guardians, and other fiduciaries on behalf of their beneficiaries.
4. A nonparty who had "assumed control" of F-1 litigation is
bound by the judgment rendered by the F-I court. Such a party,
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ii. Identical Causes ofAction
Historically, the question of whether two causes of action were
identical for claim preclusion purposes turned on the theory of recovery. 43 Each theory of recovery would give rise to a separate cause of
action, even if the factual bases of these claims were identical. 44 The
common law definition of cause of action seems at odds with the basic
goals of preclusion because it would enable a crafty advocate through
clever pleading to assert multiple causes of action based on the same
facts simply by articulating different theories of recovery.
The modem approach to defining cause of action for preclusion purposes turns on transactional analysis.45 Thus, "once a claim is
brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy. ' ' 46 This broader definition of cause of action has allowed a more far-reaching application
of claim preclusion.
The movement away from a theory-based definition of cause
of action and toward a more practical, transactional-based approach
came about largely through the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil

having been given the opportunity to present evidence, has had its
day in court.
5. A nonparty suing an action as a proxy for one already bound by
an earlier litigation is likewise bound by that litigation.
6. Various statutory schemes may expressly foreclose successive
litigation by nonlitigants, provided those schemes are consistent
with due process. Examples of these schemes include bankruptcy
and probate, as well as quo warranto and other similar suits that
may be brought on behalf of the public.
Id. at 893-95.
43. See WRIGHT, MILLER& COOPER, supranote 14, § 4407, at 178-79; CASAD
& CLERMONT, supra note 13, at 62-66.
44. CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 13, at 63 ("For the most part, if the facts
relating to an event could fit into a different form of action that involved a different
legal theory, then, in spite of the so-called general rule that res judicata could not be
avoided by changing the form of action, a judgment against the plaintiff in the first
action usually did not have claim-preclusive effect in a different form of action, even
when the same basic event was involved.").
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, §§ 24, 25(1)-(2) (AM. LAW
INST. 1982); CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 13, at 66-69; O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357 (1981).
46. O'Brien, 54 N.Y.2d at 357.
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Procedure.4 7 First, the Federal Rules introduced a simplified pleading
regimen, often described as notice pleading,48 and specifically rejected
the technical forms of pleading required at common law. 49 Recovery
turned on proof at trial, not the theories of recovery in the complaint.5"
Second, the Federal Rules permitted liberal joinder of claims
and parties in a single action.51 Now, all claims arising from a common nucleus of fact could be resolved in one action, instead of multiple actions. Failure to assert all claims arising from a given transaction
or series of transactions would mean that these unasserted claims
would be barred.52 Put another way, if claims could have been raised,
then they should have been raised. Third, the Federal Rules permit
liberal amendment of the pleadings, further discouraging the proliferation of separate lawsuits.
iii. "On the Merits"

A final judgment has no claim preclusive effects unless it is
"on the merits"; i.e. unless the judgment goes to the substance of the
claim.53 Accordingly, dismissals on "procedural" grounds, including
lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or failure to join a necessary party, do not go to the substance of a claim and
hence are not on the merits.54 On the other hand, judgments rendered
for the plaintiffs are invariably on the merits.
Nevertheless, the line dividing decisions that are on the merits
and those that are not cannot always be neatly drawn. 55 Attempts to
47. CASAD & CLERMONT, supranote 13, at 66-67; see, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 18
(addressing joinder of claims); FED. R. Civ. P. 42 (permitting the court to consolidate
claims or to order separate trials).
48. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
49. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1) ("No technical form is required.").
50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e) ("Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice."); FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2) ("When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried
by the parties' express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if
raised in the pleadings.").
51. See FED. R. Civ.P. 18-21.
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, §§ 24, 25 (AM. LAW INST.
1982).
53. See Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501-02
(2001) ("The original connotation of an 'on the merits' adjudication is one that actually 'pass[es] directly on the substance of [a particular] claim' before the court."
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 cmt. a, at 161)).
54. See WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4436, at 143.
55. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) ("[A] dismissal... -except one for lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19--operates as
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draw such a line have proven vexing for the courts. 5 6 One example of
this difficulty is a decision dismissing a case for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. 7 In dismissing a case on these
grounds, is a court saying merely that the complaint is technically defective? Or is the court saying that the complaint is inherently defective so that, no matter how the complaint is presented, the plaintiff has
no claim for relief? In the former case, dismissal would not be on the
merits; but in the latter case, it would be.
One way to address this dilemma is for a court to simply say
"with prejudice" if its decision goes to the merits, or "without prejudice" if the ruling is not on the merits. In many cases, though, the
courts would say nothing beyond "dismissed" and the problem would
persist. Modem procedural rules have addressed this problem by setting forth default presumptions that would govern unless the court
rules otherwise. 58 Thus, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
a motion to dismiss is on the merits unless the court rules that the dismissal is without prejudice. 59 Given this fix, the Restatement (Second)
ofJudgments no longer includes "on the merits" as an element of claim
preclusion.60
A second area that has posed problems for the courts has been
dismissal on statute of limitation grounds. Historically, such dismissals were viewed as not on the merits, since the imposition of a statute
of repose barred only the remedy, not the right. Nevertheless, courts
today do sometimes give claim preclusive effect to dismissals on lim61
itation grounds.

an adjudication on the merits."), with WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 15, §
4435, at 145 (discussing the issue of a dismissal for failure to state a claim as one
that requires "clear independent thought" and noting that Rule 41 (b) "cannot automatically provide sound answers").
56. See, e.g., Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 74 F.3d 567, 573 n.7 (5th Cir. 1996)

(noting confusion surrounding the phrase "with prejudice"); see WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supranote 15, § 4435, at 127 ("Thus it is clear that an entire claim may be
precluded by a judgment that does not rest on any examination whatever of the substantive rights asserted.").
57. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
58. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
59. Id.
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 cmt. a. (AM. LAW INST.
1982).
61. See Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 502 (2001).
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B. Issue Preclusion

Issue preclusion bars relitigation of issues that were litigated
and determined in the F-I forum, and that were necessary to the judgment rendered therein. 62 Its scope by definition is narrower than that
of claim preclusion. Whereas claim preclusion addresses relitigation
of prior claims, issue preclusion bars only relitigation of issues that
had been litigated and determined in F-1 .63 A key difference between
claim preclusion and issue preclusion is that claim preclusion bars
claims that were actually litigated in F-1, as well as claims that might
have been brought in F- 1 but were not.64 Issue preclusion, on the other
hand, bars relitigation of only those issues that were actually raised,
litigated, and adjudicated in F- 1.65 Although narrower in scope than
claim preclusion, issue preclusion can still have outcome-determinative effects. For example, suppose P is a passenger in a car driven by
D-1. D-1 gets into an accident with D-2, the driver of another car. In
F-1, P sues D- 1 for personal injuries and loses because the court finds
that its alleged injuries were not caused by the accident. In F-2, P sues
D-2 for personal injuries. D-2 will interpose the F-I findings on the
issue of causation, which, in turn, will strike the death knell to P's
claim in F-2.
As discussed below, 66 many applications of issue preclusion
are simple,67 while other applications have proven thornier for the
courts. 6 8 Especially challenging has been the application of offensive

62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27.
63. See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp, 456 U.S. 461,466 n.6 (1982) ("Under
res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their
privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.
Under collateral estoppel, once a court decides an issue of fact or law necessary to
its judgment, that decision precludes relitigation of the same issue on a different
cause of action between the same parties.") (citations omitted).
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § § 24-25.
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27.
66. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
67. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supranote 14, § 4416, at 425.
68. See Quinn v. Monroe Cty., 330 F.3d 1320,1328 (11 th Cir. 2003) ("We now
tread into the bramble bush of collateral estoppel.").
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non-mutual issue preclusion. 69 Indeed, most of the modem developments in preclusion law have occurred in the area of issue preclusion.7 °

II. ISSUE PRECLUSION INACTION
A. The Rise of Mutuality
Application of issue preclusion principles is a straightforward
exercise where the parties to F-1 and F-2 are identical. 71 As long as
the party against whom issue preclusion is being invoked has had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question, the doctrine
of issue preclusion applies. 72 The situation is more complicated where
69. See Jack Faucett Assocs. v. AT&T Co., 744 F.2d 118, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("The doctrine [of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion] is detailed, difficult, and
potentially dangerous."); accordIn re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 355 F.3d
322, 327 (4 th Cir. 2004) (finding that criteria for application of offensive non-mutual
issue preclusion should "be applied strictly"); Shaffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
860 F. Supp. 2d 991, 996 (D. Ariz. 2012) (noting that following a government victory in the Tobacco Cases, trial courts uniformly refused to apply offensive nonmutual issue preclusion in private follow-on actions).
70. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4416, at 425 ("Almost
all of the modem expansions of res judicata, indeed, involve issue preclusion.").
71. Few courts have attempted to define "issue" in the abstract for preclusion
purposes. At the same time most courts have had little difficulty in deciding whether
issues are in fact identical. See WRIGHT,MILLER & COOPER, supranote 14, § 4417,
at 450-54; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
1982) (suggesting that the following factors be taken into account in determining
whether issues are identical: (1) whether there is substantial overlap in evidence or
argument in the two cases; (2) whether new evidence or argument would involve the
same issues of law; (3) whether discovery in F-I embraced matters sought to be
presented in F-2; and (4) whether the claims in F-1 and F-2 are closely related).
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28; Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979) ("To preclude parties from contesting matters
that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries
from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions."); see S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49
(1897) ("The general principle announced in numerous cases is that a right, question,
or fact distinctly put in issue, and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the
same parties or their privies; and, even if the second suit is for a different cause of
action, the right, question, or fact once so determined must, as between the same
parties or their privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as the judgment
in the first suit remains unmodified. This general rule is demanded by the very object for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and
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the parties to F-1 and F-2 are not the same. Due process dictates that
a person who is not a party to the F-1 judgment cannot be bound by
that judgment.7 3 This rule makes sense; a party that has not had its
day in court should not be barred from litigating an issue. 7' For example, assume a car and a bus collide at an intersection. D, the driver
of the car, sues B, the bus company, for negligence. In F-i, the court
finds that B was 100% negligent and that D was free of any negligence, and D thus wins F-1. Subsequently, P, a passenger on the bus
sues both D and B for negligence. D may not invoke issue preclusion
on the issue of negligence against P, notwithstanding the F-1 ruling in
its favor, because P was not a party to F-1.7 5
The situation is much different, however, where a stranger to
F-I seeks to invoke the benefits of the F-1 judgment in F-2 against the
F-I loser. For example, in the car-bus crash hypothetical above, suppose P, a passenger on the bus, in F-2 seeks to preclude the bus company, which had been already found 100% liable for the accident in F1, from defending on the issue of negligence in F-2. Unlike the previous situation, B was a party to F-1, did defend on the merits, and lost.
B thus had its one bite of the apple in F-1.
Should P, a stranger to F-i, be able to benefit from the F-1
judgment in F-2? Initially, the courts answered no, citing the rule of
mutuality, which provides that one who is not bound by a judgment
cannot benefit from that judgment.7 6 Hence, in the hypothetical

repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its

enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order; for the aid of judicial
tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property
if, as between parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend the judgments
of such tribunals in respect of all matters properly put in issue, and actually determined by them.").
73. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) ("It is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party
or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard.") (citations omitted); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008) ("A person who was
not a party to a suit generally has not had a 'full and fair opportunity to litigate' the
claims and issues settled in that suit. The application of claim and issue preclusion
to nonparties thus runs up against the 'deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone
should have his own day in court."').
74. Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 892-93.(which source is this citing? Cannot have
"Id. " when the preceding footnote that has two sources).
75. Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transp. Co., 261 N.Y. 159, 161 (N.Y. 1933).
76. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4436, at 666; see also
Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912)
("It is a principle of general elementary law that the estoppel of a judgment must be
mutual.").
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above, P could not assert issue preclusion against B in F-2 because had
B been successful in F-i, B would not have been able to assert the F1 judgment against P, who had not been a party thereto. Although "the
rule of mutuality established a pleasing symmetry"Y77 -if you are not
bound by a judgment, you cannot benefit from that judgment-it was
in reality, the product of "intuitional thinking"7 8 and "a vague unanalyzed generalization, conceived, no doubt, in response to felt injustices

or anomalies in certain situations, but conceived with a sprawling generality unjustified by those situations.

79

Thus, as a rule of law, mutuality was suspect from the beginning. Worse, in certain situations, mutuality could produce unacceptably bad results.8 0 The most prominent example of bad results arose
in cases involving imputed liability giving rise to the right of indem-

nity.81 Suppose driver D and driver E, an employee of 0, get into an
accident while E is driving O's car in the ordinary course of business.
In F-1, D sues E and loses; E was found not to have been negligent.
In F-2, D sues 0 on a theory of imputed liability. 0 could be liable
only if E were found to have been negligent, but the F-1 court had
exonerated E. 0 wants to assert the F-1 judgment as a bar to any at-

tempt to prove its negligence in F-2. Under the mutuality principles,
0 cannot assert the F-1 judgment as a defense because had D been
77. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4463, at 666.
78. Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of CollateralEstoppel: Limits of the Bernhard
Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 305 (1957).
79. Id. at 322; see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979)
("By failing to recognize the obvious difference in position between a party who has
never litigated an issue and one who has fully litigated and lost, the mutuality requirement was criticized almost from its inception."); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v.
Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 327 (1971) ("In its pristine formulation, an
increasing number of courts have rejected the principle as unsound.")
80. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4463, at 671-74.
81. Id. § 4463 at 672-73 ("Early statements [of the rationale for an exception
in indemnity situations] often were simply that it would be unjust to insist on mutu-

ality. A more formal explanation was that the indemnitee should be subrogated to
the third person's claim against the indemnitor, but the indemnitor's victory has destroyed that claim. The most direct statement, however, is that denial of preclusion
would force an impossible choice between unacceptable alternatives. If a second
action can be maintained against the indemnitee, either the indemnitee must be allowed to assert his right of indemnification or the right must be defeated by the
judgment in favor of the indemnitor. To allow the right of indemnification would
be to destroy the victory won by the indemnitor in the first action. To deny the right
of indemnification would be to destroy the indemnitee's right by the result of an
action in which he took no part. It is far better to preclude the third person, who has
already had one opportunity to litigate, and who often could have joined both adversaries in the first action.").
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successful in F-1, D would not have been able to utilize the F-I judgment against 0, who was not a party thereto. Now, assume further
that F-2 then proceeds to trial and D wins. 0 has to pay D. Under
basic tort rules, 0, the passive tortfeasor, would ordinarily be entitled
to indemnity from E, the active tortfeasor. However, were 0 to pursue
indemnity against E, 0 would lose; E has already been exonerated
from any claim of negligence. 0 would be left holding the bag because D got a second bite of the apple and in F-2 was able to convince82
a jury what it had failed to prove in F-i-that E had been negligent.
Thus, allowing principles of mutuality to effectively trump the right to
indemnity would produce mischievous results.
To address this anomaly, the courts developed an exception to
83
the rule of mutuality in cases involving imputed liability. Accordingly, 0 would be able to use the F-I judgment as a defense in F-2;
specifically, 0 could bar D from introducing any evidence of E's negthe pasligence in F-2. This exception was limited to situations where
84
defense.
a
as
F-1
invoking
was
0)
as
(such
sive wrongdoer
In theory, 0 should also be able to invoke F-I offensively as a
basis of recovery. Suppose in the foregoing example that in F-i, D
sues E and loses because D was 100% negligent. Suppose further that
in F-2, 0 now wants to sue D for damage for its car. Now, 0 is invoking non-mutual issue preclusion as a sword and not a shield-as a basis of recovery, rather than as a defense. Courts initially were unwilling to go that far.85 They drew a line in the sand, distinguishing
from offensive
defensive non-mutual issue preclusion (permissible)
86
(impermissible).
preclusion
issue
non-mutual
The rationale for this offensive/defensive distinction was that
defensive non-mutual issue preclusion promoted the underlying goals
of issue preclusion-peace, efficiency, and consistency-but that
82. Id. § 4463, at 671.
83. Id. § 4463, at 673.
84. Id. § 4463, at 671; see Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings
Ass'n, 122 P.2d 892, 812 (Cal. 1942) ("The courts of most jurisdictions... recogniz[e] a broad exception to the requirements of mutuality and privity, namely, that
they are not necessary where the liability of the defendant asserting the plea of res
judicata is dependent upon or derived from the liability of one who was exonerated
in an earlier suit brought by the same plaintiff upon the same facts.").
85. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 21, § 1OA, at 659 (noting the hesitancy of

courts to allow offensive non-mutual issue preclusion); see Nevarov v. Caldwell,

327 P.2d 111, 122 (Cal. 1958) (rejecting offensive non-mutual issue preclusion in
automobile accident case); see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329
n. 11 (1979) (citing academic criticism of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion).
86. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 21, § 100A, at 659.
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offensive non-mutual issue preclusion not only was at odds with some
87
goals of issue preclusion but also was likely to produce unfair results.
The distinction is not illogical. In the case of defensive non-mutual
issue preclusion, suppose there is one plaintiff who has three potential
defendants. Would the plaintiff sue the defendants together in one suit
or seriatim? The answer is that the plaintiff would have a strong incentive to sue the defendants together. If it sued only D- 1 and won, it
would get no benefit against D-2 and D-3 because they were not parties to F-1, and thus not bound thereby.88
If the plaintiff sued only D- 1 and lost, it would then face the
defense of issue preclusion in F-2 and F-3 from D-2 and D-3. Accordingly, the smart move would be to sue all the defendants in one suit.
Permitting defensive non-mutual issue preclusion thus discourages
multiple suits, encourages efficiency, and assures consistency of outcome, and is therefore consistent with the underlying goals of issue
preclusion.89
Notably, the Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of IllinoisFoundation9" held that mutuality does not
bar defensive use of issue preclusion as long as the defendant against
whom the estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
91
the issue:
In any lawsuit where a defendant, because of the mutuality principle, is forced to present a complete defense on the merits to a claim which the plaintiff has
fully litigated and lost in a prior action, there is an arguable misallocation of resources. To the extent the
defendant in the second suit may not win by asserting,
without contradiction, that the plaintiff had fully and
fairly, but unsuccessfully, litigated the same claim in
the prior suit, the defendant's time and money are diverted from alternative uses - productive or otherwise
- to relitigation of a decided issue. And, still assuming
that the issue was resolved correctly in the first suit,
87. See Parklane,439 U.S. at 329-31 (outlining objections to offensive nonmutual issue preclusion).
88. Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transp. Co., 261 N.Y. 159, 161 (N.Y. 1933).
89. Parklane,439 U.S. at 329-30 ("Thus defensive collateral estoppel gives a
plaintiff a strong incentive to join all potential defendants in the first action if possible.").
90. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
91. Id. at 329.
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there is reason to be concerned about the plaintiffs allocation of resources. Permitting repeated litigation of
the same issue as long as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming
table or 'a lack of discipline and of disinterestedness on
the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise
basis for fashioning rules of procedure'. Kerotest Mfg.
Co. v. C-O-Two Co., 342 U. S. 180, 185 (1952). Although neither judges, the parties, nor the adversary system performs perfectly in all cases, the requirement of
determining whether the party against whom an estoppel is asserted had a full and fair92opportunity to litigate
is a most significant safeguard.
Now, suppose multiple plaintiffs are contemplating a suit
against one defendant. Here, the incentives are very different from
those in the foregoing scenario. If plaintiff P-I sues individually and
loses in F-1, the other plaintiffs are not bound and can sue D subsequently. If P-1 sues and wins, and the other plaintiffs could benefit
from P-i 's win by precluding D's defense in later cases, then the other
plaintiffs would have strong incentives to sue separately and not
jointly.93 Those other plaintiffs would wait and see, suing only after
F-1 had been decided. In that case, plaintiffs have the best of both
worlds; they are not bound by P-i's loss and can benefit from P-i's
victory. A rule that would permit offensive use of issue preclusion by
a stranger to F-1 would thus encourage multiple suits, thereby undermining the goals of peace and efficiency. 94 Moreover, further mischief may ensue. Suppose P-1 through P-4, suing separately from
each other, each loses in F- I through F-4. P-5, not bound by the earlier
suits, sues and wins in F-5. P-6 and all subsequent plaintiffs then seek
to invoke the benefits of F-5, ignoring the results in F-I through F-4.
To allow such results would not only undermine basic principles of
be
preclusion by locking in inconsistent judgments, but also would
95
F-4.
through
F-I
in
victories
very unfair to D by ignoring D's
92.
93.

Id.
Parklane,439 U.S. at 330.

94. Id.
95. Id. at 330-31 and n. 14; see Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 904 F. Supp.
2d 1009, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ("[T]he court is not persuaded that it would be fair
to give preclusive effect to the findings of the court in the [F- I] case, given the nu-

merous other inconsistent judgments, with some favoring tobacco defendants and
some favoring plaintiffs--or to apply a preclusive effect based on a single adverse
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The differing incentives in the foregoing factual scenarios led
the courts to draw a bright line permitting defensive non-mutual issue
preclusion but barring offensive non-mutual issue preclusion. Thus,
non-mutual preclusion could be used as a shield but not as a sword.
B. The Decline of Mutuality
As discussed, 9 6 though the mutuality approach had some visceral appeal, beyond vague arguments of fairness, the doctrine was
difficult to justify. In Bernhard,Justice Traynor observed that "[j]ust
why a party who was not bound by a previous action should be precluded from asserting it as res judicata against a party who was bound
by it is difficult to comprehend." 97 Criticism of mutuality, dating back
to the nineteenth century, 98 abounded by the mid-twentieth century,
and Justice Traynor's full-fledged frontal assault in Bernhard9 led
courts and scholars alike to rethink the utility of the mutuality doctrine.
Bernhardinvolved the settlement of the estate of Clara Sather.
Prior to her death, the elderly and ailing Mrs. Sather lived under the
care of Mr. and Mrs. Cook, and she authorized Cook to make withdrawals from her bank account. Cook did so from time to time to meet
Mrs. Sather's expenses. Cook also withdrew funds from Mrs. Sather's
account and transferred them to his own account for his benefit. 10 0
Following Mrs. Sather's death, Cook qualified as executor of her estate.10 1 He then administered the estate and subsequently filed an ac0 2
counting with the probate court, accompanied by his resignation.'
The accounting made no mention of the funds transferred from Mrs.
Sather's bank account to Cook, and Mrs. Sather's heirs objected,
claiming that Cook had embezzled Mrs. Sather's funds. 10 3 The

judgment."); Harrison v. Celotex Corp., 583 F. Supp. 1497, 1503 (E.D. Tenn. 1984)
(holding that plaintiff's motion for preclusion denied where there had been thirty-

five previous asbestos judgments for defendants).
96. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
97. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 122 P.2d 892,
894-95 (Cal. 1942).
98. See JEREMY BENTHAM, 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (John
Bowring ed., 1843).

99. Bernhard,122 P.2d at 894-95.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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that Mrs. Sather had made a gift of
probate court disagreed and ruled
10 4
Cook.
to
question
in
the funds
Following Cook's resignation, Mrs. Sather's daughter, Helen
Bernhard, was appointed the administrator of the estate and brought
an action against Mrs. Sather's bank for wrongfully transferring the
funds in question to Cook. 10 5 The bank pleaded the prior judgment,
arguing that since the F- I court found that Mrs. Sather had made a gift
to Cook, the bank's transfer to Cook as a matter of law could not have
been wrongful. 10 6 Bernhard argued that mutuality was lacking, and
since the bank was not bound by the F-I judgment, it could not benefit
from that judgment.1 07
Justice Traynor, writing for a unanimous court, disagreed with
Bernhard and ruled that the absence of mutuality did not bar the bank
from asserting the F-I judgment as a defense.1 08 Justice Traynor might
have viewed this case narrowly as within the well-recognized exception to mutuality involving imputed liability and ruled that the bank,
as a passive wrongdoer, could not be held liable if the conduct of
Cook, the active wrongdoer, were held lawful. But, Traynor opted not
to extirpate the mutuality
to take the narrow view. He "chose1 instead
09
torch":
the
to
it
put
requirement and
The criteria for determining who may assert a plea of
res judicata differ fundamentally from the criteria for
determining against whom a plea of res judicata may
be asserted. The requirements of due process of law
forbid the assertion of a plea of res judicata against a
party unless he was bound by the earlier litigation in
which the matter was decided... He is bound by that
litigation only if he has been a party thereto or in privity
with a party thereto. There is no compelling reason,
however, for requiring that the party asserting the plea
ofres judicata must have been a party, or in privity with
a party, to the earlier litigation.

104.

Bernhard, 122 P.2d at 894-95.

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Brainerd Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. REV.
25, 26 (1965).
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In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata
three questions are pertinent: Was the issue decided in
the prior adjudication identical with the one presented
in the action in question? Was there a final judgment
on the merits? Was the party against whom the plea is
asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication? 1°
Read broadly, the Bernhardopinion thus abolishes the requirement of mutuality altogether."' Commenting on Bernhard,Professor
Currie stated that "the glib and superficial requirement of mutuality of
estoppel had been permanently laid to rest by a triumph of judicial
statesmanship,"'1" 2 and further that "[t]he demise of the requirement of
mutuality was a welcome event." ' 1 3 Many, 1 4 but not all, 1 ' 5 states followed suit and abolished mutuality.
Bernhard's "transformation of estoppel law was neither instantaneous nor universal." ' 1 6 Although cautious, the federal courts
eventually followed Bernhardand abolished mutuality in two stages.
First, in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation,"7 the Supreme Court upheld defensive non-mutual issue
preclusion. 118 In Blonder Tongue, the patentee brought an infringement action against A in F-I and lost because the court held the patent
invalid. 119 Subsequently, in F-2, the patentee sued B, alleging the
110. Bernhard, 122 P.2d at 894-95.
111. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4464, at 330.
112. See Currie, supra note 78, at 285.
113. Id. at 284.
114. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4464, at 682 n. 1 ("Most
courts have abandoned the mutuality requirement."); see, e.g., B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v.
Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147 (1967) ("[T]he 'doctrine of mutuality' is a dead letter.").
See generally Bahler v. Fletcher, 474 P.2d 329 (Or. 1970) (en bane); Richards v.
Hodson, 485 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971); Lucas v. Velikanje, 471 P.2d 103 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1970).
115. See generally Daigneau v. Nat'l Cash Reg. Co. 247 So. 2d 465 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1971); Lukacs v. Kluessner, 290 N.E.2d 125 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Keith v.
Schiefen-Stockham Ins. Agency, Inc. 498 P.2d 265 (Kan. 1972); Howell v. Vito's
Trucking & Excavating Co., 191 N.W.2d 313 (Mich. 1971); Armstrong v. Miller,
200 N.W.2d 282 (N.D. 1972).
116. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 326
(1971); see Note, A ProbabilisticAnalysis of the DoctrineofMutuality of Collateral
Estoppel, 76 MICH. L. REv. 612, 618 (1978) ([T]he Bernharddoctrine, in the interest
ofjudicial economy, clearly retreats from a commitment to substantive justice.")
117. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 349-50.
118. Id. at 314-15.
119. Id. at 315-16.
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same patent had been infringed. 120 The trial court, on the authority of
Triplett v. Lowell, 12 1 permitted the F-2 case to go forward. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that ruling. 122 Before the Supreme Court, the
United States, as amicus curiae, argued that the rule of mutuality of
estoppel should be abandoned in patent cases. 123 Reversing, the Supreme Court upheld the defense of non-mutual issue preclusion, noting that repeated litigation by the putative patentee in an effort to have
its patent upheld would lead to a serious misallocation of resources,
and further, "[p]ermitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long
as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out reflects either the aura
of the gaming table or 'a lack of discipline and of disinterestedness on
the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of procedure."'' 1 24 The Court concluded that defensive nonmutual issue preclusion is not unfair, and the "requirement of detera
mining whether the party against whom an estoppel is asserted had 25
1
safeguard."
significant
most
a
is
litigate
to
full and fair opportunity
The second stage of the federal abolition of mutuality came
eight years later in ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore. 126 In Parklane,a
shareholder filed a class action against the company under the federal
securities laws, alleging false statements in a proxy statement issued
in connection with a merger. Thereafter, the Securities and Exchange
Commissions ("SEC") brought an enforcement action against Parklane, seeking to enjoin the false statements. The SEC case was tried
first, and the court, sitting without a jury, ruled that the proxy statement was materially false and misleading and issued a declaratory

27
judgment to that effect. 1

Thereafter, plaintiffs in the shareholders' action moved for
partial summary judgment barring the company in F-2 from defending
against the fraud allegations. 12 8 Faced squarely with the question of
whether to permit offensive non-mutual issue preclusion, the Court
29
noted the erosion of the mutuality principle in the wake of Bernhard'
but also recognized powerful arguments that had been advanced

120.
121.

Id.
297 U.S. 638 (1936).

122.

Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 317.

123.
124.

Id. at 319.
Id. at 329 (citation omitted).

125.

Id.

126.
127.
128.
129.

439 U.S. 322 (1979).
Id. at 324-25.
Id. at 325.
Id. at 326-28.
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against offensive non-mutual issue preclusion. 130 First, whereas defensive non-mutual issue preclusion creates incentives to join all defendants is one action, offensive non-mutual issue preclusion may encourage a "wait and see" attitude by plaintiffs and proliferation of
litigation. 131 Second, offensive non-mutual issue preclusion may
prove unfair to defendants. 132 For example, if the F-1 litigation is
nominal in nature, the defendant may not have a strong incentive to
defend the case aggressively and may be lulled into a false sense of
security. 133 If the defendant then loses F-I and the F-2 plaintiff sues
for significantly higher damages, the defendant is put at an unfair disadvantage in F-2 if the F-2 plaintiff seeks to invoke the benefits of the
F-1 judgment in the higher stakes F-2 litigation.
Third, if the judgment relied on to estop the defendant from
defending is "inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor of the defendant," then preclusion should be denied. 134 Otherwise,
prior judgments favoring the defendant would be totally devalued.
Fourth, it may be unfair to invoke offensive non-mutual issue preclusion where F-2 affords the defendant procedural opportunities, such as
broader discovery, not available in F-i.135
The Court ruled that "the preferable approach.., is not to preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts
broad discretion to determine when it should be applied."' 136 It further
ruled that, generally speaking, offensive non-mutual issue preclusion
should not be allowed when the plaintiff could easily have joined the
earlier action, or where the application of non-mutual issue preclusion
would be unfair to the defendant for the reasons discussed above or
"for other reasons." 137 Accordingly, the exceptions recognized and
discussed by the Court are not meant to be exclusive. 13 ' The Court
found that on the record before it, "none of the circumstances that
might justify a reluctance to allow the offensive use of collateral
130. Parklane,439 U.S. at 329-31.
131. Id. at 329-30.
132. Id. at 330-31.
133. Id. at 330.
134. Id.
135. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330-31.
136. Id. at 331.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM. LAW INST.
1982) (setting forth circumstances in which offensive nonmutual issue preclusion
may be inappropriate); see aslo In re Air Crash at Detroit Metro. Airport, 776 F.
Supp. 316, 324 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Exotics Hawaii-Kona, Inc. v. E I. Dupont De
Nemours & Co., 90 P.3d 250, 265 (Haw. 2004).

306

THE REVIEW OFLITIGATION

[Vol. 38:3

judgestoppel is present," 139 and upheld the grant of partial summary
40
1
fraud.
of
issue
the
on
defending
from
ment barring Parklane
In addition, the Court rejected defendant's claim that allowing
offensive non-mutual preclusion would violate its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 14 ' Defendant argued that to give preclusive
effect to a factual finding by the court in the equitable F-I proceeding
would effectively foreclose the jury in the F-2 legal action from leaving and determining that issue. 142 The Court rejected the "rigid" con143
struction of the Seventh Amendment advocated by the defendant
and held that a factual finding by the court in an equitable action can
have preclusive effect in a subsequent legal action where a jury trial
has been demanded. 144 Nor should any construction of the Seventh
145
Amendment turn on whether mutuality of the parties exists:
A litigant who has lost because of adverse factual findings in
an equity action is equally deprived of a jury trial whether he is estopped from relitigating the factual issues against the same party or a
new party. In either case, the party against whom estoppel is asserted
has litigated questions of fact, and has had the facts determined against
him in an earlier proceeding. In either case there is no further factfinding function for the jury to perform, since the common factual issues
have been resolved in the previous action.
Professor Clopton suggests that the Court's ruling on whether
F- I involved a non-jury trial did not affect the application of offensive
non-mutual issue preclusion may have involved some sleight of hand
since mutual issue preclusion was allowed at the time the Seventh
146
Amendment took effect, but non-mutual issue preclusion was not.
The Parklaneapproach was subsequently embraced by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, promulgated in 1982. Section 29 of
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides a list of factors sim14 7
ilar to, but more detailed than, the factors enumerated in Parklane.
The guiding principle under section 29 is "that a party should not be

139.

Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331.

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.at 332-33.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 336.
144. Parklane, 439 U.S. at at 335.
145. Id. at 335-36.
146. See Zachary D. Clopton, NationalInjunctions andPreclusion, 118 MICH.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (article at 17 n.1 13) (https://ssm.com/abstract=-3290345).
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
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precluded unless his previous opportunity was at least the equivalent
14 8
of that otherwise awaiting him in the present litigation."
III. PARKLANE IN ACTION
The Parklaneholding was transformative; instead of a rule of
mutuality subject to limited and clearly defined exceptions, we now
have a rule for non-mutuality subject to an exception where non-mutual preclusion would produce unfair results. 149 The federal courts and
most state courts have adopted the Parklanereasoning. Parklanenow
50
represents the majority view. 1
That said, not all state courts have adopted the Parklane approach.'15 Moreover, some influential academic writers have questioned the utility and fairness of a broad reading of Parklane.152 Critics would prefer the approach of the initial Restatement of Judgments,
which advocated a general rule of mutuality subject to limited and
clearly defined exceptions. 153 Critics also question whether reasoning
underlying non-mutual preclusion-that the defendant is entitled to
only one bite of the apple, regardless of whether the adversaries in F1 and F-2 are the same-may well elevate "simplistic notions of efficiency over real concerns of fairness and substantive policy.' ' 1 54 First,

non-mutuality creates inefficiencies of its own in that it (1) may

148. Id. § 29 cmt. b.
149. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 13 and accompanying text; Clermont, supra note 16, at 1121 ("[T]he law faced a basic choice between the rule of
mutuality, with a few defined extensions for derivative liability, and the rule of nonmutuality, with lots of mainly fuzzy exceptions."); see CASAD & CLERMONT, supra
note 13, at 185 ("These two are not alternative formulations that end up at the same
place in the middle. On the one hand, the extensions to mutuality were rare and
limited playing it safe and simple in extending res judicata to situations of real need
such as secondary liability. The extensions certainly did not aim at reaching every
case in which, on balance, preclusion would be desirable. On the other hand, the
exceptions to nonmutuality are many, but they surely do not reach all situations beyond the coverage of mutuality's extensions. The prevailing exceptions do not even
recognize all the reasons that preclusion might be undesirable.").
150. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329-33 (finding that the decision of whether to
allow offensive nonmutual issue preclusion is within the discretion of the trial
courts).
151. See supra text accompanying note 11 (see comment above).
152. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 13, at 176-79; see Clopton, supra
note 146, at 22-23 ("Nonmutuality is an outrage to justice.") (quoting Professor
Clermont).
153. CASAD&CLERMONT, supranote 13, at 185-86.
154. Clermont, supra note 16, at 1122.
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encourage a "wait and see" attitude on the part of prospective plaintiffs; (2) stimulates over-litigation of the F-I action in anticipation of
possible preclusive effect on subsequent litigation; and (3) imposes
the
additional litigation costs on the parties and the courts regarding
155
litigation.
subsequent
application of preclusion principles in
Second, offensive non-mutual issue preclusion is unfair in that
it (1) transforms a decision in an action between a plaintiff and a defendant in which P wins into a much broader determination of the
rights of all plaintiffs against D on the same issue; and (2) notably, in
mass tort cases, undermines procedural fairness by tilting the playing
field decidedly in favor of the stranger to F-I seeking to invoke issue
preclusion against the F-i loser. 15 6 The fact that the plaintiff in F-1
risks losing only its case in that court, while the defendant risks losing
not only F- 1 but all other cases brought by subsequent plaintiffs claiming to be victims of the mass tort, provides the F-I plaintiff with significant settlement leverage.' 5 7
Other commentators have questioned the fairness of offensive
non-mutual issue preclusion from another perspective. For example,
one commentator argues, also in the mass tort context, that there is no
prior basis for assuming that a judgment in F-I in favor of P- 1 is correct.1 58 Indeed, the F-I judgment for the plaintiff may be an aberration. To permit offensive non-mutual issue preclusion and to allow
strangers to F- 1 to invoke its benefit without sharing the litigation risks
of the defendant provides a windfall to those not participating in F1.59
The section below discusses criticisms of offensive non-mupreclusion in two parts. The first question is whether the
issue
tual
lower courts have heeded the warnings of the Supreme Court to deny
offensive non-mutual issue preclusion in cases where its application
would produce unfair results. The second question is whether, in the
post-Parklaneera of complex, multiparty, multidistrict litigation, offensive non-mutual issue preclusion should be abandoned. The short
answer to these questions is that implementation of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion by the lower courts has by and large not produced
unfair results, and that the growing complexity of modem federal

155.
156.

Id.
Id.

157.

Id.

158. Byron G. Stier, AnotherJackpot (In)Justice: Verdict VariabilityandIssue
Preclusion in Mass Torts, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 715, 742 (2009).
159. Id. at 744-45 and n.15.
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litigation does not warrant abandonment of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion.
A. The ParklaneFactors
1. Proliferation of Litigation through "Wait and See"
Parklanemakes clear that offensive non-mutual issue preclusion should be denied where the F-2 plaintiff could "easily have
joined" the F-1 action.160 However, whether one should be denied
preclusion because it could have easily joined another litigation is a
tricky question. The mere fact that a plaintiff chose to sue separately
rather than to join an existing action is not disqualifying. 161 Courts

respect the right of a party to pursue its own litigation strategy. 162 As
long as the thrust of the litigation strategy is not a "wait and see" ap63
proach, offensive non-mutual issue preclusion is permissible. 1
As discussed below, 164 one area where courts have balked at
allowing offensive non-mutual issue preclusion is where the F-2 plaintiff had opted out of a class action, the class ultimately prevailed, and
now the F-2 plaintiff seeks to invoke preclusion on issues resolved in
the F-I judgment favoring the class.' 65 This is a classic example of

160.

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).

161.

See McLendon v. Cont'l Grp., Inc. 660 F. Supp. 1553, 1563 (D.N.J.

1987).
162. Id. at 1564; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt. e (AM.
LAW INST. 1982) ("Due recognition should be given ... to the normally available

option of a plaintiff to prosecute his claim without the encumbrance of joining with
others whose situation does not substantially coincide with his own.").
163. McLendon, 660 F. Supp. at 1564 (noting that a litigation strategy, if not
motivated by a "wait and see" approach does not preclude offensive non-mutual
issue preclusion); see WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supranote 14, § 4465.1, at 72426 ("Preclusion may come to be denied only if it appears that the later plaintiff stayed
out of the first action solely in hopes of a one-way option at preclusion.").
164. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supranote 13, at 187; Clermont, supra note 16,
at 1122.
165. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d
358, 364 (7th Cir. 1987); Polk v. Montgomery Cty., 782 F.2d 1196, 1202 (4th Cir.
1986); Sarasota Oil Co. v. Greyhound Leasing & Fin. Corp., 483 F.2d 450,452 (10th
Cir. 1973); Tardiff v. Knox Cty., 567 F. Supp. 2d 201, 213 (D. Me. 2008); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 42 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (illustrating that when X opts out of a class action against defendant C, X is not precluded
by a judgment in favor of C, and similarly if the judgment is against C, X may not
invoke the benefit of preclusion regarding issues determined in that action).
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the 1966 Amendments to the
the kind of one-way intervention that
1 66
eliminate.'
to
class action rules sought
2. Locking in Inconsistent Judgments
Professor Brainerd Currie, an early critic of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion, developed the mass train wreck hypothetical1 as
67
definitive proof of the inherent unfairness of offensive preclusion.'
Suppose, Currie argued, that there were a mass train accident followed
by a series of individual personal injury suits.1 68 Suppose further that
F-1 through F-25 were decided for the railroad, and then the F-26
plaintiff wins. 169 Currie urged that it would be unfair for subsequent
plaintiffs to invoke preclusion against the railroad based on the F-26
170
result. He was right, and Parklane agreed with that assessment.
Post-Parklane,the overwhelming majority of courts have held that
imposition of issue preclusion 17in the face of prior inconsistent judgments would be inappropriate. 1
However, the Currie hypothetical involves more than merely
using non-mutual preclusion to lock-in inconsistent judgments. The
more fundamental question is whether one can trust the correctness of
the F-I judgment. 172 As Wright & Miller have observed, there is "[n]o
clear answer" to this question.1 73 Courts in the antitrust realm have
166. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 21, § 72, at 471 ("To permit [a party to opt
out of a class action and then reap the benefits of any class judgment] would make
a mockery of the [Rule] 23(b)(3) procedure, and would restore in a different form
the 'one-way' intervention that the amended rule expressly was intended to preclude.").
167. See Currie, supra note 78, at 281.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 285-86
170. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979).
171. See generally Shaffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 860 F. Supp. 2d 991,
996 (D. Ariz. 2012); Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 98-6002-H, 2012 WL
1063342 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2012); City of St. Louis v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
No. 22982-09652-01, 2010 WL 2917188 (Mo. Cir. Ct. June 2, 2010); In re Light
Cigarettes Mktg. Practices Sales Litig., 691 F. Supp. 2d 239 (D. Me. 2010); Curtis
v. Altria Grp., No. 27-CV-01-18042, 2009 WL 5820516 (D. Minn. Oct. 14, 2009),
aft'd, 792 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); Grisham v. Philip Morris, Inc., 670
F. Supp. 2d 1014 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp.
2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev'don other grounds, 522 F.3d 215 (2nd Cir. 2008); see
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4465.3, at 761 ("When nonmutual
preclusion is confronted only after a string of inconsistent verdicts, it may seem particularly easy to deny preclusion.").
172. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4465.3, at 757.
173. Id.

Spring 2019]

ISSUE PRECLUSIONRE VISITED

been especially concerned about erroneous outcomes and the resulting
false positives.' 74 In Trinko, the Supreme Court underscored the high
cost of error in antitrust cases, observing that "[m]istaken inferences
and the resulting false condemnations 'are especially costly, because
they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. ,,1 75 Similarly, in Twombly, the Court once again warned of the
high cost of false positives,' 76 and counseled trial courts to refrain
from overly broad inferences from complaints and to dismiss at the
outset "largely groundless claim[s]". 177 Clearly, where the trial court
gets it wrong in the first instance, the application of issue preclusion
only compounds the error. Nevertheless, cases involving "dispersed
mass torts," such as the Asbestos and Tobacco Cases, do shed some
light on this issue. 178 In the mass tort context, courts have been reluctant to preclude the losing party based on the findings in the initial case
out of concern that (1) the facts may not have been fully developed;
(2) the court may not have been equally convenient for both parties;
and (3) the F-I case is just a piece of a much longer dispute involving
many more parties.' 79 However, as the case matures through successive trials, with improved understanding through more detailed discovery and better scientific knowledge, a pattern emerges and results
become reliable.' 80 In these circumstances, earlier inconsistent judgments "should not stand in the way of preclusion."' 181
3. Differing Stakes in F-I and F-2
Parklanealso cautions that offensive non-mutual issue preclusion should not be invoked so as to take unfair advantage of a defendant by attempting to invoke preclusion as an action for substantial
damages based on an F-1 judgment for nominal damages.'1 82 Suppose
two automobile drivers get into a motor vehicle accident. In F-1, D- 1
sues D-2 for minor damages to its vehicle and wins a nominal judgment of $350. In F-2, P, a passenger in D-l 's car, then sues D-2 for
$3.5 million, alleging that it suffered a brain injury in the accident, and
174. See generallyVerizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
175. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414.
176. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551.

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 557-58.
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4465.3, at 763.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 764.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979).
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seeks to preclude D-2 from defending on the negligence issue. Courts
will not allow a defendant to be whipsawed by a nominal F-1 judgment. 183 Note that this situation is a far cry from the facts of Parklane.
There, defendants knew of potentially massive liability lurking in
shareholder suits.1 84 Indeed, the shareholder suits had actually been
filed priorto the SEC enforcement action.1 85 Parklane could not credthough only
ibly maintain that the stakes were not high in F-i, even
186
government.
the
by
sought
been
had
relief
equitable
4. Difference in Procedural Remedies
Parklane further held that offensive non-mutual issue preclusion would be inappropriate where F-2 offered procedural advantages
not available to the defendant in F-i.187 Again, the lower courts have
heeded this admonition. For example, preclusion may be denied
where: (1) F-1 is a court of limited subject matter jurisdiction;1 88 (2)
F-2 has procedural remedies not available in F-1;189 and (3) witnesses
not available in F-1 are available in F-2. 190 In addition, courts have
also ruled, despite the view in Parklanethat unavailability of ajury in
F- I is a neutral factor, that the lack of a jury in F- I can be taken into
account as a "non-dispositive factor when balancing the equities of
issue preclusion."1' 91 Thus, where F-1 was a non-jury trial and F-2
involves punitive damages before a jury, the absence of the jury in F1 may be considered when deciding the preclusion issue.192 Finally,
burden of proof in F-I is less strinpreclusion will be denied where the193
gent than the F-2 burden of proof.

183. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM. LAW INST.
1982); see Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 465, 493 (M.D.
Pa. 2010) (holding that preclusion was denied and defendant had no incentive to
litigate vigorously F-1 issues of causation and damage).
184. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 324; see also In re DirecTV Early Cancellation
Litig., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (noting that defendant was a
party to other class action cases and knew the stakes).
185. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 324.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 324-25.
188. Pennington v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370 (Alaska 1970).
189. Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 869-70 (2d Cir. 1991).
190. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4465.2, at 738.
191. See Grisham v. Philip Morris Co., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1036 (C.D. Cal.
2009).
192. Id. at 1036-37.
193. Littlejohn v. United States, 321 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2003).
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5. "Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate"
The Parklane factors are not exhaustive. 19 4 Parklane also
made clear that offensive non-mutual issue preclusion should not be
allowed where the party against whom preclusion is invoked did not
95
have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question.'
Parklanethus grants "trial courts broad discretion to determine when
[non-mutual preclusion] should be applied." 196 Also, the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments sets forth a detailed listing of circumstances
where offensive non-mutual issue preclusion should not be permitted. 197 The thrust of the Restatement (Second) approach is that a party
should not be precluded "unless his previous opportunity was at least
the equivalent of that otherwise awaiting him in the present litigation." 198 Yet, as Wright & Miller observe, "[1]ower-court decisions
have not even approached the possible limits that could be found in
the invocation of justice, equity, and discretion."'1 99 Nor have the
courts developed a litmus paper test for fairness; 200 rather, the lower
courts have tackled the issue on a case-by-case basis. 201
Thus, preclusion has been denied where: (1) there is reason to
question the viability of the F-1 judgment; 20 2 (2) F-1 findings are used
to preclude some, but not all, of the defendants; 20 3 (3) no efficiencies
would be achieved by preclusion;20 4 (4) allowing preclusion might
confuse jurors; 20 5 (5) the burden of proof with respect to the issue upon
194. In re Air Crash at Detroit Metro. Airport, 776 F. Supp. 316, 324 (E.D.
Mich. 1991); Exotics Hawai'i-Kona, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 90 P.3d
250, 265 (Haw. 2004).
195. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1979).
196. Id.at 331.
197.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM. LAW INST. 1982)

198.
199.
200.

Id. § 29 cmt. b.
See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4465, at 714.
Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 333-34.
See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4465, at 716.

201.
202.
203.

See Schwartz v. Pub. Admin. of Bronx, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 72 (N.Y. 1969).
See AIG Ret. Servs., Inc. v. Altus Fin. S.A., No. CV 05-1035-JFW

(CWx), 2011 WL 13213602, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
204. Acevedo-Garcia v. Monroig, 351 F.3d 547, 577 (1st Cir. 2003) ("The need

to relitigate individual issues that overlap the common issues may provide a special
reason to deny preclusion-little if any trial time will be spared.. .") (quoting 18A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER § 4465.3); In re

Light Cigarettes Mktg. Practices Sales Litig., 691 F. Supp. 2d 239, 251 (D. Me.
2010); Grisham v. Philip Morris Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2009);
Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
205. Light Cigarettes,691 F. Supp. 2d at 251; Schwab, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.

THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION

314

[Vol. 38:3

20 6
which preclusion is sought is more demanding in F-2 than in F-i;
20 7
(6) there is a difference in governing law between F-I and F-2; and
208
In short, the
(7) there are inconsistent judgments on the issues.
preclusion
non-mutual
of
uses
courts have the tools to rein-in rogue
and have utilized these tools to avoid unfair applications of that doctrine. The parade of horribles predicted by the critics of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion has simply not come about.

B. Modern Criticism
The traditional arguments against offensive non-mutual issue
preclusion are not without substance, but they are not sufficiently
compelling in light of Parklane to justify the abandonment of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion.2 0 9 They certainly do not warrant a
return of mutuality principles espoused in the first Restatement of
Judgments. Nevertheless, doubts about the wisdom of allowing offensive non-mutual issue preclusion persist. 210 The twenty-first-century
arguments against offensive non-mutual preclusion are more nuanced
than those made pre-Parklane. These arguments focus on (1) asymmetry of risk between the F-1 defendants and the stranger to F-I seeking to invoke its benefits; (2) the probability of error in F-I that could
result in locking in wrong outcomes in all subsequent litigation; (3)
the administrative costs of implementing offensive non-mutual issue
preclusion.

211

1. Asymmetry of Risks
A fundamental objection to sanctioning offensive non-mutual
issue preclusion is that litigation risks are not shared equally by plaintiffs and defendants. 2 12 The F-I plaintiff is litigating only its case,
while the F-I defendant is litigating not only the F-I case but also all
cases that might be brought against it by all other similarly situated
plaintiffs. For example, in the train wreck scenario, the single-plaintiff
206. See Littlejohn v. United States, 321 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2003).
207. Schor v. Abott Labs., 457 F.3d 608, 615 (7th Cir. 2006).
208. Syversonv. IBM Corp., 472 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[A]llowing
plaintiffs to cherry-pick favorable prior decisions to preclude issues in an ongoing
or subsequent litigation raises serious fairness concerns.").
209. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4464, at 695.
210. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 13, at 185-86.
211. Id. at 176-77.
212. Id. at 177.
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passenger in F-I is concerned only about its claim; but in defending
F-i, the railroad must take into account the risks posed by the F-1
claim, as well as the risks posed by all future claimants who are not
parties to F-l 213 The differences in financial risks between individual
plaintiffs and the defendant may be enormous. This asymmetry in
risk, in turn, gives plaintiffs significant settlement leverage.214 As a
result, plaintiffs may be able to extract higher settlements than would
be the case if offensive non-mutual issue preclusion were not permitted.
The asymmetry of risks, in turn, encourages other passengers
on the train to sit on the sideline and await the outcome of F-1. Those
other passengers have little incentive to join F-i; they are not bound
by any adverse judgment and may invoke the benefits of a favorable
judgment.215 Because other plaintiffs have the incentive to adopt a
wait-and-see posture and not join the F-1 case, allowing offensive
non-mutual issue preclusion would encourage the proliferation of litigation, thereby undermining the basic goals of issue preclusionpeace, consistency, and efficiency.2 16
The simple answer to these objections is that the risks of litigation are almost always asymmetric. The plaintiff chooses the time,
place, forum, and grounds for the lawsuit and therefore always has a
leg up on the defendant. Moreover, in cases involving enforcement
action by the federal government, such as the securities fraud case in
Parklane or an antitrust criminal prosecution by the Antitrust Division, defendants almost always have more at stake than the government enforcers because of the likelihood of private damages actions
down the road. Furthermore, where F-I is an enforcement action, defendants cannot argue that private plaintiffs' failure to join F-2 bars
their assertion of offensive issue preclusion because private plaintiffs
cannot be parties to F-1 and have no choice but to "wait and see."
Thus, free riding by prospective plaintiffs may be unavoidable in certain circumstances. In those situations, defendants are well aware that
the F-1 outcome has significant implications beyond the facts of that
particular litigation. Equally important, as discussed below, 2 17 even if
issue preclusion does not apply, defendants still would have a strong
incentive to litigate F-1 aggressively in order to avoid adverse stare
decisis effects. The asymmetry of risk arises from the factual context
213.
214.

Id.
Id.; see CLERMONT,supra note 16, at 1122.

215.

CASAD & CLERMONT, supranote 13, at 176.

216.

Id.

217.

See infra, n. 246 and accompanying text.
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in which the case arises, not from permitting offensive non-mutual issue preclusion.
That is not to say that free riding should be encouraged. Parklane makes abundantly clear that where a stranger to F-1 seeking to
invoke its benefits "could easily have joined" that litigation, issue preclusion should be denied.218 Courts have heeded this directive. A case
in point involves class actions pursuant to Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, where a class member chooses to opt out of
the class. 2 19 Then, after the class has been successful in its suit, the
now-individual plaintiff, having previously opted out, seeks to invoke
the benefits of the class judgment.2 2 0 The vast majority of courts who
have faced this issue have denied offensive non-mutual issue precluintervention"
sion, noting that this is precisely the kind of "one-way
221
eliminate.
to
that amended Rule 26(b)(3) sought
Similarly, courts need to be particularly vigilant in mass tort
cases, such as those involving asbestos, tobacco, and prescription
drugs, where, in effect, a whole industry may be tried in the F-1 litigation, and the outcome of the F-1 litigation could determine the fate
of that entire industry.2 2 2 In these cases, the asymmetry of risk between the F-I plaintiff and F-I defendant may well justify denial of
offensive non-mutual issue preclusion, at least where the F-I action is
the only decision to have been rendered by any court. Judge Posner's
223
rationale for denying class certification in Rhone-Poulenc applies
equally to the question of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion:
For this consensus or maturing of judgment the district
judge proposes to substitute a single trial before a single jury.... One jury... will hold the fate of an industry in the palm of its hand.... That kind of thing can
happen in our system of civil justice .... But it need

not be tolerated when the alternative exists of submitting an issue to multiple juries constituting in the aggregate a much larger and more diverse sample of
218. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
219. See, e.g., Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814
F.2d 358, 365 (7th Cir. 1996).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 362-65; In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, MDL No.
1827, 2012 WL 4858836 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2012) at *4.
222. Cf Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing the perils of placing the fate of an entire industry in the hands of a
single jury).
223. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1995).
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decision-makers. That would not be a feasible option
if the stakes to each class member were too slight to
repay the cost of suit ....

But this is not the case....

Each plaintiff if successful is apt to receive a judgment
in the millions. With the aggregate stakes in the tens
or hundreds of millions of dollars, or even in the billions, it is not a waste of judicial resources to conduct
more than one trial, before more than six jurors, to determine whether a major segment of the international
pharmaceutical industry is to follow the asbestos manufacturers into Chapter 11.224

Mass torts should be distinguished from single-event mass accident cases, such as those involving airplane crashes,225 where claims
are based on one incident, as opposed to a series of incidents. In mass
tort cases, liability issues may be highly individualized. For example,
in asbestos cases, outcomes for individual plaintiffs may differ depending upon: (1) the nature and duration of their exposure to asbestos; (2) whether they were smokers; and (3) whether they lived in a
region where air quality was poor. Simply put, it is difficult to lump
these various individual plaintiffs into one category. On the other
hand, in air crashes involving mass fatalities, the liability issues are
the same with respect to all plaintiffs across the board. In such cases,
courts can generally feel confident in applying offensive non-mutual
issue preclusion.226
224.

Id. at 1300.

225.

See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14 § 4465.3, at 757-58. One

distinction that may help sort through the multiple claimant problem is drawn between "single-event" wrong that injure many people all at once and "dispersed"
mass event that injure many people at different times and places. Single events are
commonly identified with torts involving such matters as the crash of a commoncarrier vehicle, a hotel fire, or collapse of a building. Dispersed events are commonly identified with environmental contamination or products associated with
widespread injury. The problem of nonmutual preclusion is likely to arise when the
widespread injuries are sufficiently serious to support multiple individual actions;
widespread but trivial injury, commonly identified with petty consumer fraud, is
more likely to be addressed by a class action or a small number of aggregated actions.
Id.
226. See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Detroit Metro. Airport at Detroit, Mich. on
Aug. 16, 1987, 776 F. Supp. 316, 323-26 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (explaining that it is
not unfair to permit individual plaintiffs to invoke offensive non-mutual issue preclusion in light of the thoroughness of the pretrial and trial proceedings, defendant's
claims of unfairness ring hallow); see generally WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra
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This is not to suggest that offensive non-mutual issue preclu2 27
sion is never appropriate in mass tort cases. As discussed above, as
mass tort litigation matures through successive trials, consistent findings emerge and results become sufficiently reliable to warrant the application of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion.
2. Probability of Error
Broadly speaking, the preclusion doctrine presents a policy
choice between getting litigation done and getting it right; that is, efficiency vs. fairness. 22 8 Critics of non-mutual issue preclusion question whether it is fair to assume that a first-in-time judgment is, in fact,
229
correct, and therefore dictates the outcome of all related litigation.
Obviously, if the F-1 judgment were wrong, the invocation of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion multiplies the magnitude of the
court's error and the concomitant unfairness to defendants. However,
courts are not powerless to deal with these situations. If a judgment is
plainly wrong, if-for example, circumstances suggest a compromise
verdict or a verdict based on defendants' deep pockets-then "taking
the prior determination at face value for purposes of the second action
would extend the effects of imperfections in the adjudicative process
beyond the limits of the first adjudication, within which they are

note 14 § 4465.3, at 758; but see Acevedo-Garcia v. Monroig, 351 F.3d 547, 57277 (1 st Cir. 2003) (explaining that in single-event cases, non-mutual preclusion may

be denied where there is significant overlap between the issues to be tried and the
issues to be precluded because invoking preclusion in these circumstances is not
likely to achieve significant net gains in efficiency).
227. See supra nn. 180-81 and accompanying text.
228. See CLERMONT, supra note 16, at 1081 ("There is an obvious tradeoff
between getting things right and getting them finished.").

229.

As Professor Currie has observed:
If we are unwilling to treat the judgment against the railroad as res
judicata when it is the last of a series, all of which except the last
were favorable to the railroad, it must follow that we should also
be unwilling to treat an adverse judgment as res judicata even
though it was rendered in the first action brought, and is the only
one of record. Our aversion to the twenty-sixth judgment as conclusive adjudication stems largely from the feeling that such a
judgment in such a series but be an aberration, must we have no
warrant for assuming that the aberrational judgment will not come
as the first in the series.

Currie, supra note 78, at 289.

Spring 2019]

ISSUE PRECLUSIONREVISITED

319

accepted only because of the practical necessity of achieving finality.''230 Here, preclusion should be denied. Similarly, ifnew evidence
not available in the initial litigation were discovered in subsequent
cases, the court may choose not to allow the invocation of issue pre23 1
clusion.
Finally, the appellate process assures the integrity of the F-I
findings. If the F-I judgment is subsequently affirmed in the appellate
arena, we can feel confident that the outcome is correct, and to impose
issue preclusion based on that outcome would not propagate error.232
3. Efficiencies Generated by Preclusion are Illusory
A third argument against offensive non-mutual issue preclusion is that efficiencies generated by its application are illusory. 233
First, the applicability vel non of issue preclusion introduces new issues in the case that must be briefed, argued, and resolved. This process takes time and costs money. For issue preclusion to apply, the
court must determine that (a) the issues in F-i and F-2 are identical;
(b) the issue was litigated and determined in F-i; (c) the issue was
necessary to the F- 1 judgment; and (d) invocation of issue preclusion
would not be unfair to the defendant.234 That is no small task.2 3 5

230.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29, cmt. g (AM. LAW INST.
1982).
231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29, cmt. j (AM. LAW INST.
1982).
232. By the same token, non-mutual preclusion may be denied where there was
no opportunity to appeal. See, e.g., Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.,
149 F.3d 387, 392-96 (5th Cir. 1998).

233. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 13, at 176 (explaining that in mass
tort cases, abandonment of mutuality may very well have increased-not reducedthe amount of judicial effort to resolve common disputes); see CLERMONT, supra

note 16, at 1091-92 ("Efficiency policies can cut the other way too. Litigating about
res judicata can be seriously inefficient. In addition to these 'direct costs,' the fear
of future preclusion might stimulate over litigation in the initial action. Also, there
are the inefficient 'error costs' of deciding to live with an incorrect judgment. Moreover, these economic arguments play out against a complicated background. For
example, the parties' settlement in light of prior outcomes would often avoid relitigation without any preclusion rule.").
234.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, §§ 28-29 (AM. LAW INST.

1982).
235. See Michael D. Green, The Inability of Offensive CollateralEstoppel to
Fulfill Its Promise: An ExaminationofEstoppel in the Asbestos Litigation, 70 IOWA
L. REv. 141, 186 (1984) ("One lesson vividly demonstrated by the experience in
asbestos litigation is that a significant proportion of party and judicial resources may
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Among other things, the court must determine whether (1) issues in F1 and F-2 are identical; (2) certain issues in F-1 were litigated and
decided; (3) the losing party in F-1 had a full and fair opportunity to

23 6 Very little case
litigate; and (4) prior inconsistent judgments exist.

law exists on whether and when issues are identical for preclusion purposes. 7 In addition, a detailed examination of the trial transcript may
be necessary in order to ascertain whether a particular issue was actually litigated and determined in the action. 238 Whether a finding is
necessary to judgment is in some cases obvious, but in other cases may
require a detailed analysis of the court record. 239 A finding is neceson it." 240
sary to the judgment "only when the final outcome hinges
Issues decided "only collaterally or incidentally" are not given preclusive effect. 24 1 As a general matter, outcome turns on findings that are
favorable to the F-1 winner; and therefore only issues decided in favor
242
of the F-I winnter are "ajudicated" for issue preclusion purposes.

be consumed by the efforts invested in determining whether collateral estoppel is
appropriate in a particular case.")
236. Id.; see In re TFT-LCD (FlatPanel)Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1827,
2012 WL 4858836 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2012) ("The Court concludes that Dell
has not met its burden to show that it can assert offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. Dell opted out of the direct purchaser class action, and the jury was explicitly
instructed by the Court that Dell and other opt outs were not part of the litigation,
that Dell had brought its own lawsuit, as had others, and that 'the existence of these
lawsuits should also not influence your consideration of this case.' As Dell's claims
were not before the jury, the jury could not have concluded that 'Toshiba knowingly
participated in a conspiracy to fix, raise, maintain or stabilize the prices of TFT-LCD
panels sold to Dell.' In addition, in the DPP trial the jury was not instructed to and
did not make any findings regarding the identity of Toshiba's alleged co-conspirators or the duration of the conspiracy. The fact that there is substantial overlap between the pleadings and evidence in the DPP case and Dell's case in insufficient to
meet Dell's burden of demonstrating that the issues for which it seeks preclusive
effect are identical to those that were actually litigated and decided in the DPP trial.")
(citations omitted).
237. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14 § 4417, at 450-52 ("A
few decisions have even attempted to define the abstract dimensions of an issue for
preclusion purposes."); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §27 reporter's
note, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (noting that ascertaining the dimensions of an
issue is "most difficult" and proposing a list of relevant factors in defining "issue");
see also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
238. See CLERMONT, supranote 16, at 1117 (discussing the difficulty of establishing issue preclusion).
239. See WRIGHT, MJLLER& COOPER, supra note 14 §4421, at 588-91.
240. Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 835 (2009).
241. Norton v. Larney, 266 U.S. 511, 517 (1925).
242. See Cambria v. Jeffrey, 29 N.E. 2d 555, 555-56 (Mass. 1940).
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Finally, with respect to whether a party has had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate in F-i, the Supreme Court has stated very
broadly that "[r]edetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason
to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed
in prior litigation." 24 3 Although the cost of ascertaining the applicability of issue preclusion may be significant, so, too, is the cost of additional trials; and it is not at all clear that subsequent trials provide a
cheaper alternative.
Second, critics of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion argue
that the prospect of preclusion down the line fosters inefficiency by
forcing defendants to commit excessive resources to F-1; i.e., to "overlitigate" F-i to secure a victory and thereby abnegate any preclusion
argument in subsequent cases. 244 This argument has some visceral
appeal; after all, it makes sense to say that overall litigation expenses,
like discovery expenses, should be proportional to the needs of the
case. 24 5 However, on reflection, this argument cannot withstand scrutiny. In the first place, there is no established standard for defining
where litigation expenses are proportional to the needs of the case.
Indeed, the resources needed to litigate a matter vary from case to case.
Secondly, it is not clear what critics mean when they argue that offensive non-mutual issue preclusion creates incentives to "over-litigate."
The fact is that even if offensive non-mutual issue preclusion were not
permitted, a defendant would still have to litigate the F-I case in the
shadow of other prospective or actual claims in order to avoid adverse
effects under the doctrine of stare decisis. 24 6 Accordingly, the F-1 defendants will always have strong incentives to seek a victory in F-1,
even if that means incurring expenses disproportional to the needs of
the case, wholly apart from the applicability of the preclusion doctrine.
Third, critics of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion further argue
that its invocation creates upward pressure on the amounts that

243. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n.1 1(1979).
244. See Erichson, supranote 22, at 950-51 ("[W]herever a litigant can foresee
related litigation with nonparties, nonmutual issue preclusion produces incentives to
invest greater resources into winning in order to prevent adverse determinations that
may carry a damaging issue-preclusive effect in subsequent suits.").
245. Cf Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see Erichson, supra note 22, at 950 ("The
rational litigant will expend resources on the lawsuit in proportion to the stakes of

the suit.").
246. ROBERT G. BONE, THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 252 (1st ed.
2003) ("Even with a mutuality rule, [defendant] must worry about stare decisis effects in future suits.")

THE RE VIE W OFLITIGA TION

322

[Vol. 38:3

defendants would have to pay to settle disputes.247 Where a defendant
faces multiple suits by plaintiffs, loss of the F-1 suit could result in
liability to many future plaintiffs. 248 The increase in the defendant's
costs would exceed an individual plaintiffs expected gain for victory. 249 Inevitably, defendants would have to pay more in order to buy
peace. Skeptics, however, question the impact of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion on settlements. 250 Whether non-mutual preclusion actually adds to litigation costs is uncertain. Perhaps the most
that can be said is that "[i]t is hard to be confident that on balance,
reduce the total burdens of
modem rules of issue preclusion actually
' 251
courts.
the
or
parties
either
litigation on
C. The Mendoza Rule: Restricting Offensive Non-mutual Issue
Preclusion
The trend line, however, has not moved uniformly in the direction of the broader application of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion. One situation where the federal courts have countered the trend
toward the broader application of preclusion rules involves cases
where the United States is the defendant. In United States v. Mendoza,25 2 the Supreme Court ruled that offensive non-mutual issue preclusion may not be invoked against the United States. 253 The facts of
Mendoza are somewhat unique. Shortly after attacking Pearl Harbor,
Japanese military forces invaded the Philippines Islands, then a territory of the United States. During World War II, Congress passed a
statute that would expedite applications for United States citizenship
for Filipinos who fought on behalf of the United States. 2 54 However,
at the urging of the Filipino government, which was concerned about
247. See Note, Reducing the Unfair Effects of Nonmutual Issue Preclusion
through Damage Limits, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1459, 1471-72 (2019).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1472 ("Because a rational defendant will tend to settle a suit if the
expected costs of litigation plus the expected outcome exceeds the cost of settlement,
nonmutual collateral estoppel increases the amount at which a defendant would rationally be willing to settle.").
250. See Michael D. Green, The Inability of Offensive CollateralEstoppel to
Fulfill a Promise: An Examiniation of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IOWA L.
REv. 141, 183-84 (1984) (suggesting that the impact of issue preclusion in bringing
about settlements is "apparently inflated").
251.

See WRIGHT, MILLER& COOPER, supra note 14 § 4416, at 437.

252.
253.
254.

464 U.S. 154 (1984).
Id. at 162.
Id. at 156.
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a possible mass post-war emigration of Filipinos to the United States
after impending independence, the program was discontinued.255
Decades later, a Filipino veteran sued the United States, alleging that discontinuation of the program to expedite American citizenship applications of Filipino veterans violated due process of law.256
The lower courts ruled for the Filipino veteran. 257 Thereafter, Mendoza brought a similar action and moved to invoke offensive non-mutual issue preclusion against the government.258 Rejecting Mendoza's
arguments, the Supreme Court held that "nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel simply does not apply against the government in such a
way as to preclude relitigation of issues such as those involved in this
259
case."
The Court reasoned that the federal government is not in a position identical to private litigants. 260 First, the government is involved
in far more cases than individual private litigants. 261 To force the government to pursue appeals in each case that it lost would be unduly
burdensome.262 Second, the government is involved in cases of particular public importance.263 Many cases involved Constitutional issues, many of which arise only in litigation to which the government
is a party.264 Accordingly, the government may frequently be a party
to lawsuits against different parties that may involve identical legal
issues.

2 65

Third, a rule permitting offensive non-mutual issue preclusion
against the government "would substantially thwart the development
of important questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue." 266 Fourth, unlike private litigants,
the government must consider factors such as limited government resources and crowded dockets before authorizing appeals. 267 Fifth,
successive administrations should remain free to adopt policies

255.

Id.

256.

Id. at 156-57.

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 157.
Id. at 156-57.
Id. at 162.
Id. at. 159.
Id. at 159-60.
Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id.
Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160.
Id. at 161.
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differing from their predecessors and ought not to be bound by preclu268
sion consequences of judgments accepted by prior administrations.
The Court did not expressly hold that offensive non-mutual issue preclusion could never be invoked against the United States; rather, preclusion limitations apply to "relitigation of issues such as
those involved in this case." 269 Nevertheless, the fact that Mendoza
involved relatively few Filipino veterans and accordingly would have
little impact on the public at large suggests that its ban on offensive
non-mutual issue preclusion against the government is fairly broad.
Courts post-Mendoza have generally denied preclusion against the
government.27 ° Still, some lower courts have permitted preclusion
against the government.2 71 Professor Wright has suggested that preclusion may be appropriate "when the government brings an action to
vindicate essentially private interests." 272 The scope of Mendoza remains unclear, but the holding on its own terms would seem to allow
for narrow exceptions that would permit offensive non-mutual issue
preclusion to be used against the government.273 Nor did the Court
explain why offensive non-mutual issue preclusion should not apply
to the government.
Professor Clopton has convincingly argued that the foregoing
policy-based explanations do not hold water. 274 First, concerns about
encouraging over-litigation, preventing percolation of cases in the
lower courts, and creating uncertainty are arguments that apply to the
implementation of non-mutual issue preclusion generally and not
solely to actions brought against the federal government and do not
justify withholding preclusion where the federal government is a defendant.275
Second, the contention that the federal government is involved
in cases raising issues of importance supports special treatment for the
federal government is dubious. Many cases involving private parties
raise issues of public importance.276 Indeed, important public issues
litigated by the federal government are not infrequently also litigated
268. Id. at 161-62.
269. Id. at 162.
270. See, e.g., Harrell v. U.S. Postal Serv., 445 F.3d 913, 921-22 (9th Cir.
1997).
271. See, e.g., DiSimone v. Browner, 121 F.3d 1262, 1267-68 (9th Cir. 1997).
272. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14 § 4465.4, at 779.
273. See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 162 (suggesting that its holding is limited to
issues such as those involved in this case).
274. See Clopton, supra note 146 at 20-22.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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by private parties wherein those private parties-unlike the federal
2 77
government-are subject to offensive non-mutual issue preclusion.
On the other hand, the federal government is not limited in its ability
to utilize offensive non-mutual issue preclusion against private parties.278 The preclusion door should swing both ways.
More importantly, not every case involving the federal government is necessarily important. A review of the federal docket reveals
that the majority of cases involving the United States concern mun279
dane litigation involving prisoner rights and social security appeals.
Third, concerns that allowing offensive non-mutual issue preclusion against the federal government would lock future administrations into policies that such administrations might consider unwise is
also not a compelling rationale for the Mendoza280 rule. As Professor
Clopton points out, "there is no inviolable principle against locking in
the federal government., 281 Indeed, the government may be locked
into a particular position in a variety of ways, including through contract, plea bargains, or non-prosecution agreements.2 82 They can also
be locked in by mutual issue preclusion.2 83 Thus, concerns of inter' 284
administration lock-in are "overblown."
The rationale for Mendoza 's broad prohibition on the use of
offensive non-mutual issue preclusion against the government is shaky
at best. Accordingly, the preferable approach would be to eliminate
Mendoza's blanket prohibition but permit the courts to deny offensive
non-mutual issue preclusion in cases that truly involve issues of public
importance. Parklane and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments
provide ample authority for this approach.
IV.

LITIGATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AND PRECLUSION

The litigation landscape has changed markedly since the rules
of preclusion were first systematized in the Restatement of Judgments
in 1942, and ever since the promulgation of the Restatement (Second)

277.

Id.

278.

Id.

279.

See Clopton, supra note 146 at 20-22.

280.

Id. at 25.

281.
282.

Id.
Id. at 25-26.

283.
284.

Id. at 26-27.
See Clopton, supra note 146 at 25.
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2 85
ofJudgments in 1982. We live in an era of the vanishing civil trial.

Many cases that enter into the federal civil justice system are now diverted to arbitration or another form of alternative dispute resolution.286 The cases that do enter the court system are typically decided
on pretrial motions, including motions to dismiss and motions for
summary judgment, or they are settled.2 87 Only a tiny percentage of

cases actually go to trial. 288 Given the fact that trials are quite rare, the
question is whether issue preclusion is becoming irrelevant. The answer to that question is decidedly no, although the role of preclusion
is somewhat different in today's era of complex litigation than it was
in an earlier era when cases were simple.

285. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials
andRelated Matters in Federaland State Courts, L J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459,
460 (2004); see Patrick E. Higginbotham, The PresentPlight of the United States
District Courts, 60 DuKE L.J. 745, 747 (2010) ("[T]rials are an increasingly small
part of the daily routine of the federal trial courts. Most district courts now try very
few civil or criminal cases .... ); see also Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Judges' Views
on Vanishing Civil Trials, 88 Judicature 306, 308 (2005).
286. See, Edward D. Cavanagh, Federal Civil Litigation of the Crossroads:
Reshaping the Rule of the FederalCourts in Twenty- First Century Dispute Resolution, 93 OR. L. REV. 631, 633 (2015) ("Many putative litigants have chosen to opt
out of the courts in favor of some form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR),
which they perceive as cheaper, faster, more private, and less risky than the court
system.").
287. See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading,Meaningful Days in Court,and
Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 286, 358-59 (2013) ("We are moving toward a civil justice system
in which an increasing number of actions may be stillbom. Not only is case disposition occurring earlier, it is being based on less and less information regarding the
facts and merits of a dispute. A trial provides live evidence based on complete discovery, examination, cross-examination, and often the deliberation of a jury. Summary judgment (and class certification), although primarily based on lawyer's papers, often is delayed until after merit (or class action) discovery has been completed
and all the relevant informational cards theoretically are face-up. But even that is
not always true. The motion to dismiss, however, is based only on the complaint.
Not discovery. Not evidence. Not witness testimony. Not cross-examination. Not
the voice of the community .... Adjudication based on a single paper-the complaint-as evaluated by subjective factors such as judicial experience and common
sense and an abstract comparison to a hypothesized innocent explanation of the defendant's conduct is a process that is alien to me. Personal jurisdiction challenges,
of course, have nothing to do with the central justice question-who should win and
who should lose.").
288. Id.
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A. The Settlement Dynamic
In theory, as discussed above, 2 89 in jurisdictions that permit offensive non-mutual issue preclusion, the F-i plaintiff in a mass tort
case has significant leverage in any settlement negotiation, because
whereas the F-i plaintiff risks losing only its case, the F-i defendant
effectively risks losing all cases. 290 The reality is much different and
not so simple. In mass tort cases, the goal of the federal civil justice
system is not to try every case, whether all at once or seriatim; rather,
the goal is to settle the matters without trial. 2 9 1 The pretrial process is
not to prepare the case for trial, but rather to get this case in a posture
whereby it can be settled. Settlement can be achieved by direct negotiations between the parties, or through the use of intermediaries, such
as a settlement master, a magistrate judge, or the assigned judge.
Another approach, one sanctioned by the Manual for Complex
Litigation, is for the court to designate a representative case--called a
bellwether case-try that matter, and use the results of the bellwether
trial as a roadmap for a universal settlement.2 9 2 Critics of bellwether
trials point out the practical difficulties of identifying a truly representative case: the plaintiffs have an incentive to promote their strongest case, while defendants may propose the weakest case.2 9 3 In those
circumstances, the underlying goals of the bellwether trial would be
thwarted, and the process would fail. If the parties fail to agree on a

289.
290.

See, supra, n. 214 and accompanying text.
See Clermont, supra note 16, at 1122.

291.

See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT

ix (2007) ("As in traditional tort litigation, the end game for a mass tort dispute is
not trial but settlement.").
292. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.315 (2004) ("Test
cases should produce a sufficient number of representative verdicts and settlements
to enable the parties and the court to determine the nature and strength of the claims,
whether they can be fairly developed and litigated on a group basis' and what range
of values the cases may have if resolution is attempted on a group basis. The more
representative the test cases, the more reliable the information about similar cases
will be.").
293. See, e.g., In re Chevron U.S.A, Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir 1997)
(where plaintiff and defendants separately choose the test cases, the trial of each "is
not a bellwether trial. It is simply a trial of fifteen (15) of the 'best' and fifteen (15)

of the 'worst' contained in the universe of claims involved in the litigation."); cf
Stier, supra note 159, at 740 ("[M]oreover, the first plaintiff may have been selected
to be the most sympathetic by plaintiffs' counsel, increasing the chance of an aberrational verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in the first suit.").
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partisan
truly representative case, the judge, in order to avoid any
2 94
gamesmanship, might select the bellwether case at random.
It may be that even after the bellwether trial, the parties cannot
reach a universal settlement. In such instances, the outcome of the
bellwether trial will potentially have issue preclusive effect if the
plaintiff is successful, and stare decisis effect in any event. 295 As a
practical matter, however, the potential preclusive effect will have
minimal impact. Real world courts will continue to push the parties
hard to settle and are not likely to offer trial dates in the near future.
A related situation where settlement and issue preclusion intersect is where a matter is tried to judgment for the plaintiff but settled
while an appeal is pending. Defendants may request, as a condition of
settlement, that the trial court vacates its judgment for the plaintiff.296

This is a blatant effort to avoid the preclusive effect of the F-1 judgCourt has rejected this attempted end run
ment, and the Supreme
2 97
around preclusion law.

B. Class Actions and MandatoryJoinder
Concerns about the potential unfairness of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion could be obviated if all claimants could be made
part of the F-I action, either through the existing class action mechanism or through some form of mandatory joinder. As discussed below, neither is likely to provide a viable solution.

294. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.315 ("To obtain
the most representative cases from the available pool, a judge should direct the parties to select test cases randomly or limit the selection to cases that the parties agree

are typical of the mix of cases.").
295. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 759 (3d Cir. 1974); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:00-1898, 2007 WL
1791258 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2007) ("Because all issues will be tried as to the
representative wells, issue preclusion will attach only as to those defendants against
whom there is an adverse verdict and who will then have the opportunity for appellate review.").
296. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt, Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 282-83 (2d Cir.
1985).
297. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 27 (1994)
("To allow a party who steps off the statutory path to employ the secondary remedy
of vacatur as a refined form of collateral attack on the judgment would--quite apart
from any consideration of fairness to the parties--disturb the orderly operation of
the federal judicial system.").
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1. Class Actions

At first blush, the class action would seem to be the ideal vehicle to put the issues surrounding offensive non-mutual issue preclusion to rest.29 8 Where there are multiple claimants in mass tort cases,
the claimants would file as a class action suit. 2 99 All member of the
plaintiffs' class, as well as the defendants, would be bound by the outcome. Claimants who did not want to be part of the class could optout, and would not be bound by the outcome of the class action. However, they also 00
could not benefit from any class judgment favoring the
plaintiff class. 3

The problem with this approach is that in the past three decades, the federal courts have become increasingly hostile to class actions.30 ' Recent Supreme Court decisions, notably Wal-Mart Inc. v.
Dukes,3 °2 have raised the bar for class certification, making it much
more difficult for cases to go forward as class actions. 30 3 The results
are either that the cases go away because the plaintiff cannot efficiently try the cases individually, or the "litigants often must endure
multiple, closely related lawsuits" 30 4 that will inevitably generate issue
preclusion questions. Given this hostile climate, class actions are not
a practical solution to the potential unfairness created by offensive
non-mutual issue preclusion.
2. Mandatory Joinder
An alternative to the class action as a vehicle for addressing
issues arising from multiparty, multidistrict litigation is to create an
298.
299.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
Fed. R. Civ. P 23(c)(2)(B)(v).

300.

Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elect. Contractors Assn, 814 F.2d 358,

365 (7th Cir 1996); In re TFT-LCD (FlatPanel)Antitrust Lit., at *4.
301. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Lit., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (1st
Cir. 2008).
302. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359 (2011) ("To meet the
commonality requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P 23(a)(2), the common contention "must
be of such a nature that it is capable of class wide resolution-which means that
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity
of each one of the claims in one stroke.").
303. Id.; Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013) (denying class
certification, concluding that common question did not predominate where the Court
found the regression module of plaintiffs' expert could not be accepted as evidence
that damages could be measured for the entire class); Amchem Products Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997) (denying certification of a settlement class).
304. See Erichson, supra note 22, at 946.
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"aggregation mechanisms for consolidating widespread litigation."305
That approach, however, has proven to be a non-starter.3 0 6 A threshold
problem is that implementation of this approach would require legislative or rule-making action. 30 7 Joinder provisions under the Federal
Rules as currently drafted are largely permissive. 30 8 Moreover, even
if mandatory joinder or other forms of aggregation could be achieved,
courts would still face the major logistical hurdle of how to try all
claims in one action. Issues involving due process and possible juror
confusion would almost certainly abound.30 9 Courts then might opt
for the bellwether trial, discussed above. 310 In that case, mandatory
joinder would seem redundant. In short, although mandatory joinder
might have some visceral appeal, it is not a practical solution to the
problem of potential unfairness arising from the use of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. Nor would consolidation effectively address
fairness concerns, especially in light of the Supreme Court's recent
BMS311 decision, which limits the reach of a forum's long-arm statute
in consolidated cases.312
C. The Way Forward
The task of formulating and implementing issue preclusion
principles has historically fallen to the courts. Unquestionably, the
courts have proven equal to that task. As the foregoing analysis
demonstrates, the hope of Parklanecritics for legislative or rule-making actions to modify or overrule Parklaneis a pipe dream. The standards enunciated in Parklane and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments have been workable. The doomsday predictions by Parklane
305. Id.
306. See Clermont, supra note 16, at 1123 ("Nevertheless, society has chosen,
after balancing benefits and costs, to follow this mandatory joinder route no farther
than provisions such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 on compulsory joinder
go."); see also Erichson, supra note 22, at 946-47 n.14.
307. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supranote 13, at 185-87.
308. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18-20.
309. Corley v. Google, Inc., 316 F.R.D. 277, 289 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
310. See supra nn. 292-95 and accompanying text.
311. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 137
S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
312. In BMS, over 600 plaintiffs filed eight suits in California State count alleging injury from use of Plavix, a blood thinner manufactured by BMS. Id. at 1777.
Only 86 of the plaintiffs were from California; 592 were from 33 other states. Id.at
1778. The Court ruled that due process bars the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
BMS on claims unconnected to its activities in the former state. Id.at 1781. Accordingly, the claims of the non-resident plaintiffs were dismissed. Id. at 1783.
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critics based on theoretical objections to offensive non-mutual issue
preclusion simply have not come about. Far from the knee-jerk implementation of non-mutual preclusion, the courts have been both cautious and circumspect.3 1 3 The train is on the right track and should not
be derailed.
CONCLUSION

The changing nature of litigation in the federal system has not
lessened the need for development and implementation of a coherent
set of principles governing preclusion. In most areas of preclusion, a
broad consensus in fact exists. Whether courts should allow offensive
non-mutual issue preclusion is the only real area of debate in the preclusion field. The case-by-case approach articulated by the Supreme
Court in Parklanestrikes the proper balance between fairness and efficiency. Bright line rules might be more predictable, but the ultimate
goal is to get just outcomes, not simply predictable outcomes. The
answer to Professor Clermont's question is, therefore, that we are better off with a rule of non-mutuality with a lot of fuzzy exceptions, instead of a rule of mutuality subject to a few very well-defined exceptions. The case for change has not been made, and it would be a
serious mistake to turn back the clock and re-embrace a rule of mutuality.

313.

See Clopton, supra note 146, at 12-13 ("In a sample of 49 federal district

court cases from 2000 to2017, judges exercised their discretion to decline nonmutual

preclusion in 43% of cases.") (citations omitted).

